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Article 3

Can Religious Influence
Ever Be “Undue” Influence?
Jeffrey G. Sherman†
[T]here are no instances where men are so easily imposed upon as at
the time of their dying, under pretense of charity . . . .
Attorney-General v. Bains1

The short answer to my title’s question is “yes.” The
longer answer is, well, longer. The Lord Chancellor’s quoted
remark about charity and deathbed susceptibility reflects our
law’s longstanding uneasiness with eleventh-hour charitable
bequests and our courts’ struggle to differentiate between a
testator’s own independent charitable impulses and those
imposed on her by an outsider playing upon her fears or
weakness. The Bains case itself involved an improperly
executed will.2 The defective will contained a charitable
bequest, and the Chancellor was asked to rule that the bequest
was nonetheless effective (as an appointment), presumably
because of the longstanding judicial policy favoring transfers to
charity.3 He refused.4 A lack of proper execution may suggest

†
Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology. A.B., 1968, J.D., 1972, Harvard. In writing this Article, I have benefited
greatly from the advice and wisdom of Daniel Hamilton and Steven Heyman, and I am
grateful for their assistance. And I should like to thank the Marshall D. Ewell
Research Fund for supporting my work on this project.
1
Prec. Ch. 270, 272, 24 Eng. Rep. 131, 131 (1708). A similar—indeed,
possibly identical—case is reported as Attorney-General v. Barnes, Gilbert Eq. Ca. 5, 25
Eng. Rep. 4 (1708).
2
Strictly speaking, the term “will” states a legal conclusion about a
document: that the document has been validated (provisionally, at least) by a probate
court. Until such validation occurs, the document is only a “purported will.” See, e.g.,
Stephen v. Huckaba, 838 N.E.2d 347, 350 (Ill. App. 2005). Similarly, until a purported
will is admitted to probate, the maker of that will is not a testator but only an
“apparent testator.” See, e.g., Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 633 S.E.2d 722, 726
(S.C. 2006). In the interests of simplicity, however, I shall follow custom and use only
the words “will” or “testator” in this Article except in those instances where “purported
will” or “apparent testator” is necessary to avoid ambiguity.
3
See GARETH JONES, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF CHARITY 1532-1827, at 3-4
(1969). Jones writes:

579

580

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:2

that a testator was subjected to undue influence at the time her
will was written,5 and the Chancellor implied by his remarks
that the presence of a charitable bequest in the will made the
suggestion of undue influence—and therefore of invalidity—
more plausible rather than less.
An extreme, but not unrepresentative, example of the
circumstances the Chancellor had in mind can be found in the
facts of In re Estate of Hee.6 The testator, Louis Hee, was an
elderly man living alone and in extreme ill health.7 Indeed, he
was bedridden, and none of his relatives lived nearby.8 A few
months before Hee’s death, some members of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses called at his home to interest him in their literature
and religious beliefs, and their visits were soon followed by
other members on a similar mission.9 (Hee had never been and
never became a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses.10) One of
these visitors, John Hartley, Jr., proceeded to prepare for Hee’s
signature a will making the Watch Tower Bible and Tract
Society of Pennsylvania (the parent organization of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses) Hee’s sole legatee.11 Some seventy-five
days before Hee’s death, Hartley, accompanied by two other
members of Jehovah’s Witnesses, traveled to Hee’s home and
obtained his signature on the will.12 Hartley immediately sent
the executed will to the main office of the Watch Tower Bible
Many privileges were [in the years before the Reformation] granted to the
charitable legacy which were denied to the private legacy. For example, no
charitable legacy was allowed to fail because it was too indefinite, and
generous rules of construction were developed to cure the uncertainty. So, a
testator who had bequeathed [personal] property ‘to the church’ was deemed
to have bequeathed it to his parish church . . . .
Id. at 5. As to privileges accorded charitable legacies under more recent law, see infra
notes 74-76 and 85.
The frustratingly brief published report of Bains does not clearly explicate
the petitioner’s argument for validating the charitable transfer. Nonetheless, the
Chancellor’s quoted remark strongly—albeit circumstantially—supports my
assumption that the petitioner directly or indirectly invoked this policy of favoritism
toward charities.
4
Bains, Prec. Ch. at 272, 24 Eng. Rep. at 132.
5
See, e.g., Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of
Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 4-5 (1941).
6
Hartley v. Toth (In re Estate of Hee), 252 So. 2d 846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1971).
7
Id. at 847.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
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and Tract Society of Pennsylvania.13 No copy of the will was left
with the testator, and indeed no disclosure of the will’s
existence was made until after Hee’s death.14 Hee’s siblings
contested the will on the ground of the undue influence of
Hartley and others, and quite appropriately the siblings
succeeded.15
For centuries, Anglo-American courts and legislatures
entertained suspicions of gifts to charities generally and to
religious charities in particular. During the late middle ages, a
time when the culture at large was deeply religious, these
suspicions amounted to outright hostility generated by the
fears of the feudal aristocracy.16 Later, as notions of
testamentary freedom took hold, two other concerns replaced
the feudal ones. First, lawmakers began to have misgivings
about the amount of wealth that charitable bequests removed
from the stream of unimpeded commerce:
[B]y the specious pretence of charity, the solicitations of [potential
charitable donees], and the pride and vanity of donors, it is to me
highly probable, that too great a part of the lands in this kingdom
may soon come to be [held in perpetuity by charitable foundations],
to the prejudice of the nation in general, and to the ruin or unjust
disappointment of many a man’s poor relations . . . .17

And second, they were concerned that “the church was
taking advantage of . . . the [deathbed] fears of the faithful for
its own aggrandizement.”18 These concerns, for the welfare of
the commonwealth and for the security of testators, led
Parliament and many American legislatures to enact statutes,

13

Id.
Id.
15
Id. at 848.
16
See infra text accompanying notes 24-51.
17
These words were spoken by a member of the English House of Lords in a
1736 floor debate on a piece of legislation that barred charitable devises of land. See
JONES, supra note 3, at 110-11. For a discussion of this 1736 legislation, see infra text
accompanying notes 103-111.
18
A.H. Oosterhoff, The Law of Mortmain: An Historical and Comparative
Review, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 257, 267 (1977). Indeed, “some [eighteenth century]
legislators expressed a distrust of the clergy and a belief that a failure to control
conveyances in trust for charitable uses would result in a renewal of death-bed vigils
on the part of ambitious clerics.” Id. at 282. These concerns were not without historical
foundation. As early as the thirteenth century, in response to a papal decree, English
testators who bequeathed nothing ad pias causas (for pious purposes) “might be denied
the Eucharist and interred in unconsecrated ground.” JONES, supra note 3, at 3.
14
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often called mortmain statutes, placing limits on testamentary
transfers to charity.19
Between 1976 and 1998, the last eleven American
mortmain statutes were repealed or overturned,20 but their
repeal did not reflect any observed changes in human nature.
On the contrary, the human frailties that had prompted the
statutes’ original enactment continued to mar the legal
landscape as before. The statutes were repealed because they
were unworkable, not because they were unnecessary.
Undergirding the repeal movement was a belief that the law of
undue influence could be relied upon to prevent, in individual
cases, the kinds of imposition that the mortmain statutes’
broader brush was designed to reach.21 But the law of undue
influence can serve as an adequate substitute for mortmain
statutes only if courts treat the influence of charitable or
religious actors with the same wariness as they exhibit with
secular, avowedly materialistic actors. And, unfortunately,
courts have sometimes displayed an inappropriate indulgence
19

“Mortmain” means “dead hand” in the Anglo-Norman variant of French
spoken in England during the Late Middle Ages. The most widely accepted explanation
of the term’s invention and application is that given by Lord Coke:
[T]he true cause of the name and the meaning thereof was taken from the
effects as it is expressed in the statute itself . . . so as the lands were said to
come to dead hands as to the lords for that by alienation in mortmaine they
lost wholly their escheats, and in effect their knights-service for the defense
of the realme, wards, marriages, reliefes and the like; and therefore was
called a dead hand, for a dead hand yeeldeth no service.
1 EDWARD COKE, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON subdiv. 2.b (Phila., Robert H. Small
1853) (15--?) (quoted in Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 259).
The “dead hand” metaphor enjoys continued vitality today, but its
application has been broadened to include all the posthumous influences of testators.
See generally ARTHUR HOBHOUSE, THE DEAD HAND (1880); Adam J. Hirsch & William
K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1 (1992); Gareth H.
Jones, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY
119 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977). (Actually, “dead hand” is more of a synecdoche
than a metaphor.)
20
See infra note 124.
21
See, e.g., In re Estate of Kinyon, 615 P.2d 174, 175 (Mont. 1980) (noting
that the annulment of the state’s mortmain statute “in no way abandons these
safeguards [the prevention of overreaching by charities and the protection of the
interests of relatives] since existing law is sufficient to prevent the abuses at which the
mortmain statute was directed”); Mary F. Radford & F. Skip Sugarman, Georgia’s New
Probate Code, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 605, 669-70 (1997) (explaining the reasons for
Georgia’s repeal of its mortmain statute). See Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 294-95.
Writing in 1951, one scholar argued that mortmain statutes should be retained and
their prevalence increased because “[t]he legal principles of fraud, undue influence, or
mental incapacity have not and do not meet the problem.” G. Stanley Joslin, Legal
Restrictions on Gifts to Charities, 21 TENN. L. REV. 761, 763 (1951) (punctuation
altered).
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toward the former. While the old mortmain statutes
themselves would be anachronisms in today’s estate planning
climate of nonprobate transfers22 and split-interest giving,23
American law still has much to learn from them as it confronts
charitable bequests procured in dubious circumstances.
In Part I of this Article, I shall discuss the long but
ultimately unsatisfactory career enjoyed by mortmain statutes
as bulwarks against undue religious or charitable influence. In
Part II, I shall discuss the law of undue influence generally.
And in Part III, I shall discuss how traditional undue influence
law has fallen short in the context of religious bequests and
how traditional law can be strengthened by a rule declaring
that all relationships between a testator and her religious or
spiritual advisor are per se “confidential relationships” for
purposes of litigating any will contest. Such a rule would
largely shift to the proponent of the will the burden of
producing evidence supportive of the will’s validity.
I.

MORTMAIN STATUTES: THE TRADITIONAL LEGISLATIVE
SOLUTION

A.

Early English Mortmain Law: A Public Law Response

While American mortmain statutes were private law
devices designed to protect the expectations of a charitably
inclined testator’s family, the English mortmain restrictions
began life as public law devices with a political purpose:
protecting the feudal aristocracy.24 Under English law at the
time of feudalism, all land was said to be held of the King.
Every other person who had the right to occupy and cultivate a
piece of land possessed that right only as a tenant—either a
22
Today, a decedent’s nonprobate transfers, such as life insurance and
revocable inter vivos trusts, generally govern more of her property than a traditional
will, John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of
Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1108 (1984), and mortmain statutes were often held
to apply only to wills and not to nonprobate transfers. See, e.g., Kent v. Katz (In re
Estate of Katz), 528 So. 2d 422, 426-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (held not to apply to a
revocable inter vivos trust); In re Will of Frank, 383 N.Y.S.2d 777, 779-80 (App. Div.
1976) (same).
23
“Split-interest” trusts—that is, trusts in which one interest (say, a life
income interest) is granted to or retained by an individual and another interest (say,
the remainder interest) is granted to a charity—have become popular estate planning
instruments to take advantage of favorable valuation rules to lessen the impact of
transfer taxes, particularly for unmarried property owners who cannot avail
themselves of the estate tax marital deduction. See, e.g., F. Ladson Boyle, Evaluating
Split-Interest Valuation, 24 GA. L. REV. 1, 2-3, 28-40 (1989).
24
See Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 296.
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tenant of the King himself or a tenant of another tenant of
(another tenant of) the King25—and, as a condition of his
continued tenure, he owed certain obligations to the person
from whom he held that right (that is, his lord).26
The most common form of feudal land tenure was
“knight service,” pursuant to which the tenant owed military
service to or on behalf of his lord. While historians have noted
considerable variations in local customs, there seems to have
been some agreement that a single knight’s fee should
normally have comprised sufficient acreage to generate an
annual income of about £20, so a tenant with sufficient acreage
to produce, say, £60 of annual income would have owed his lord
the service of three knights: the service of three fully armed
horsemen to serve in the army for 40 days in the year in time of
war.27 But of even more value to the lord than these obligations
of military service were a number of financial obligations,
known as the incidents of knight service. Among the most
important of these feudal incidents were aids (a right to
demand money from the tenant in certain circumstances of
need),28 relief (a right to payment of a certain sum of money
when an adult heir to the land assumed his inheritance upon
the death of the prior tenant),29 wardship (a vendible right,
25

F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 24
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1979) (1908). But see SUSAN REYNOLDS, FIEFS AND VASSALS:
THE MEDIEVAL EXPERIENCE REINTERPRETED (1994) (critiquing the conventional
understanding of feudalism as a coherent, distinctive socio-legal system).
26
MAITLAND, supra note 25, at 25. If a named tenant’s lord was not the King
himself but rather some other tenant of the King or a tenant of another tenant of the
king, the lord of that named tenant was known as a mesne or intermediate lord. If a
named tenant’s lord was the King himself, then there was no mesne lord and the
tenant was one of the King’s tenants in chief (or tenants in capite). Id. at 24.
27
Id. at 25-26. “[T]he division of land into districts, each with an allotted
quota of men and material, is a simple and obvious device; we find, for example, in
1679 that an act in Virginia required each district to provide one man armed and
mounted for service in the Indian wars.” THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 514 (5th ed. 1956) (citing Virginia Statutes at Large, ii,
434, 435).
28
MAITLAND, supra note 25, at 27.
[T]he lord can legitimately demand aid . . . from his tenant when [the lord] is
in need of money. The aid has been considered as a free-will offering, but one
which ought not to be refused when the demand is reasonable . . . [In the
Magna Carta, King] John was compelled to promise that he would exact no
aid without the common counsel of the realm save in three cases, namely in
order to make his eldest son a knight, in order to marry his eldest daughter,
and in order to redeem his body from captivity . . . .
Id.
29

Id.
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arising upon the death of a tenant leaving a minor child as
heir, to enjoy the profits from the land until the child attained
the age of twenty-one (if male) or fourteen (if female)),30
marriage (a vendible right to sell the ward (that is, the
deceased tenant’s minor child) in marriage),31 and escheat (the
right to recover the tenanted land if the tenant died without an
heir).32
In general, a feudal lord cared very little about who his
tenant was at any time, so long as he could be sure that the
tenant had the means to meet his feudal obligations, and the
ancillary rules of land law reflected the aristocracy’s
indifference as to the tenant’s identity and its insistence on his
material sufficiency. The system of primogeniture, which by
the twelfth century had become the customary form of descent
in England, assured the lord that his new tenant (the deceased
tenant’s eldest son, to the exclusion of all other children of the
decedent) would have the same means of providing knight

If the tenant in knight service having an inheritable estate died leaving an
heir of full age, that heir owed a relief for his land . . . a sum due on his
taking up the fallen inheritance. . . . [Lords sometimes used the occasion to
demand that the heir] buy the land at nearly its full price.
Id. Eventually, it became common for the relief for a knight’s fee to be £100. Id.
30
Id. at 28.
If the heir of a military tenant is under the age of twenty-one, being male, or
fourteen, being female, the lord is entitled to wardship—to wardship of the
body of his tenant, to wardship of the land also. This means that he can enjoy
the lands for his own profit until the boy attains twenty-one or the girl
fourteen. He is bound to maintain the child and he must not commit waste,
but within these limits he may do what he likes with the land and take the
profits to his own use—and this profitable right is a vendible commodity:
wardships are freely bought and sold.
Id. At least one authority maintains that the relevant age for females was sixteen, not
fourteen. See Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 265.
31
See MAITLAND, supra note 25, at 28.
[T]he lord can dispose of the ward’s marriage, can sell his ward in marriage.
The only limit to this is that the match must be an equal one; the ward is not
to be disparaged, married to one who is not his or her peer. At first
apparently all that the lord claims is that his female tenant shall not marry
without his consent—a demand which is reasonable enough while the
military tenures are great realities:—my female tenant must not carry the
land which she holds of me to a husband who is my enemy. But the right has
grown far beyond this reason:—it is now [i.e., the end of Edward I’s reign]
extended to males as well as females, and the marriage of every ward is a
vendible commodity.
Id.
32
See id. at 29 (“If the tenant died without an heir[,] the land escheated, that
is, fell back to the lord—it became his to do what he pleased with.”).
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service as his deceased ancestor had, since the land would
never be subdivided upon the ancestor’s death.33 Further, under
primogeniture, land was not subject to devise at all,34 except in
certain privileged cities such as London.35 But, starting in
about the year 1200, land was freely subject to inter vivos
alienation, even in derogation of an eldest son’s expectations,36
and the problems of mortmain originally arose in this inter
vivos context.
Two types of inter vivos land transfers particularly
threatened the feudal lord’s interests. The first was
subinfeudation, the creation of a subtenancy by a tenant.37 The
subinfeudating tenant would transfer to another person a
portion of the land that he held of his lord, thereby becoming
an inferior lord to whom the new grantee owed feudal
obligations.38 Subinfeudation created a risk for the original lord
that his original tenant would, after the partial conveyance,
have insufficient remaining assets to meet his original feudal
obligations.39 At the behest of the feudal aristocracy, therefore,
Parliament, as part of the famous Statute Quia emptores,40
barred all subinfeudation but authorized alienation by
substitution.41 A tenant could no longer convey part of his
estate but could convey all of it by means of a substitution of
holders of the tenancy:42 a substitution that presumably
preserved the lord’s feudal rights.43
The second kind of inter vivos conveyance that
threatened the feudal lord was a conveyance to the Church,44
33

See PLUCKNETT, supra note 27, at 527.
A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 54 (2d ed. 1986). Personal
property could be bequeathed, but jurisdiction over wills of personalty was vested in
ecclesiastical courts, not in the secular courts. MAITLAND, supra note 25, at 523;
PLUCKNETT, supra note 27, at 740-41; JONES, supra note 3, at 4.
35
JONES, supra note 3, at 6 n.7.
36
PLUCKNETT, supra note 27, at 528-29.
37
J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 257 (3d ed.
1990).
38
Id.
39
PLUCKNETT, supra note 27, at 540.
40
18 Edw. 1, c. 1 (1290) (Eng.).
41
BAKER, supra note 37, at 298; PLUCKNETT, supra note 27, at 540.
42
Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 269.
43
If the tenant in question was a tenant in chief of the Crown, restrictions on
inter vivos alienation remained, notwithstanding Quia emptores. See PLUCKNETT,
supra note 27, at 542.
44
Strictly speaking, the Church qua Church was not a corporation capable of
holding title to property. Instead, title might be held by “the Bishop of Ely” in his
capacity as Bishop, or by “the Abbey of S. Albans” as such. See MAITLAND, supra note
25, at 510. Remember, therefore, that whenever I use a phrase like “Church property,”
34
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known as a conveyance in mortmain.45 An ecclesiastical tenant
could certainly furnish a lord with hired knights on horseback,
just as a secular tenant could, but the Church could not marry,
have offspring, or die. Thus, a conveyance by a human tenant
to the Church, though it did not deprive the lord of continued
knight service,46 did deprive him of valuable future incidents of
relief, wardship, marriage, and escheat. The feudal aristocracy
was particularly concerned about collusive gifts of land to the
Church, whereby a tenant could evade his feudal obligations
and deprive the lord of the lord’s due by ostensibly granting
lands to the Church while retaining the right to occupy and the
right to demand a regrant of the land.47 The Great Charter of
1217 explicitly barred such collusive transfers,48 and then, some
sixty years later, the 1279 Statute of Mortmain (De viris
religiosis)49 barred all alienations in mortmain—whether
collusive or not—and the penalty for such attempted
conveyances was declared to be forfeiture to the lord of the
fee.50 Transfers to secular corporations were likewise
considered alienations in mortmain and barred by the 1279
I am referring to any of various properties held by particular religious officers or
houses, rather than to assets held by an organization known as “the Church.”
45
See ARTHUR R. HOGUE, ORIGINS OF THE COMMON LAW 257 (1986); see also
supra note 19.
46
See HOGUE, supra note 45, at 25. While “knight service” was a common
form of tenure even for ecclesiastical officers or houses, an exceptional form of
ecclesiastical tenure—frankalmoign—existed until it was all but abolished by the
Statute Quia Emptores in 1290. SIMPSON, supra note 34, at 10-11.
Sometimes religious bodies and religious persons, monasteries, bishops,
parsons, hold land for which they do no earthly service to the lord. They are
said to hold by way of free alms, free charity, per liberam elemosynam, in
frankalmoign. The theory of tenure however is saved by the doctrine that
they owe spiritual service, that they are bound to pray for the soul of the
donor who has given them this land, and this duty can be enforced by
spiritual censures in the ecclesiastical courts.
MAITLAND, supra note 25, at 25.
47
Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endowments and the Democratization of
Dynasty, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 873, 900 (1997).
48
BAKER, supra note 37, at 277; PLUCKNETT, supra note 27, at 541.
49
7 Edw., stat. 2, c. 13 (1279) (Eng.).
50
Id. The ecclesiastical grantee’s title was not void; it was merely voidable at
the instance of the lord or of his lord. That is, termination of the grantee’s title required
a positive act by the lord or by the King. Moreover, a license to alienate in mortmain
could, without much difficulty, be purchased from the King, Brody, supra note 47, at
900, and such licenses were in fact granted “lavishly.” PLUCKNETT, supra note 27,
at 542. If an alienation in mortmain was made without the purchase of a license, but
no lord thereafter exercised in fact his right of entry to undo the conveyance pursuant
to the 1279 statute, the grant in mortmain was deemed to have been impliedly licensed
through waiver of the right of entry. Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 268.
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statute inasmuch as corporations, like ecclesiastical houses,
never die or marry or have children.51
Thus, the original mortmain statute was designed to
protect the feudal aristocracy as a class,52 not to protect the
lord’s heirs from disinheritance as individuals.53 What
protected the lord’s heirs (or at least the lord’s eldest son) from
disinheritance were the rules of primogeniture and the lack of
any right of testation. But change was afoot that would soon
expose heirs to a risk of disinheritance: the development of the
“use.” The use may have begun its existence as a device for
circumventing primogeniture.54 For example, if A owned land
and wanted to transfer it at death to all his sons equally
instead of to his eldest son only, A could convey the land inter
vivos to B and his heirs to the use of A for life and then, upon
A’s death, to the use of A’s sons. Such a conveyance had the
added benefit of insulating A from the feudal incidents owed to
A’s lord inasmuch as the incidents attached only to the
transmission of a legal estate.55 But not only did the use permit
circumvention of primogeniture and feudal obligations, it
effectively permitted testation where none had been permitted
before, since A could convey the land to the use of anyone, not
just to the use of his sons. Indeed, a landowner could convey
land to a feoffee during his lifetime to such uses as he might
declare in his yet-to-be-executed will.56 Consequently, by the
early fifteenth century, most land in England was held in use,57
and landowners became accustomed to making the equivalent
of testamentary transfers. Finally, in 1540, freeholders in land
were granted the power to devise it without going through the
rigmarole of enfeoffment to uses.58
51

See HOGUE, supra note 45, at 74.
The statute, in its opening lines, stated that it was enacted to prevent
“services which are owed from fiefs of this sort, and which were originally established
for the defense of the kingdom[, from being] wrongfully withheld.” See id.
53
Concern that land might vest perpetually in ecclesiastical organizations to
the detriment of the state was not peculiar to England. “Already during the Roman
Empire prohibitions were enacted by one of the first Christian emperors to prevent the
aggrandizement of the church through the acquisition of land.” Oosterhoff, supra note
18, at 260.
54
See Brody, supra note 47, at 900-01.
55
WILLIAM E. BURBY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 7 (3d ed.
1965). (Of course, B was chargeable with the feudal incidents, but evidently methods
existed for insulating B as well. Id.)
56
JONES, supra note 3, at 6-7.
57
Brody, supra note 47, at 901.
58
The 1540 statute was the Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1540) (Eng.).
Four years earlier, as a response to the loss of feudal benefits occasioned by the
52
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From the aristocracy’s point of view, the availability of
devise aggravated the mortmain problem. Back when
charitable transfers of land could be accomplished only inter
vivos, a tenant’s natural desire to hold until death what was
his could be relied upon to check what Professor Simpson called
“excesses of piety”;59 but once charitable devises could be freely
made, that natural desire no longer served as a check.
Coinciding with this development was the English
Reformation. Although King Henry VIII made extensive use of
his rights of entry (as lord Paramount) under the Statute of
Mortmain in his efforts to destroy religious houses and the
power of the Roman Catholic Church in England,60 the
protection of individual lords’ feudal incidents took on a
diminished importance in his national policy.61 Instead,
national policy was directed toward the encouragement of
charitable giving: secular charitable giving.
That legislative enactments to encourage private
secular philanthropy came about concurrently with the English
Reformation is a matter of historical fact.62 Different
hypotheses exist, however, as to the reasons for the
concurrence of these developments. Certainly there was at the
time of the Reformation a need for schools, hospitals, and
venues of relief for the poor and aged; and King Henry’s
suppression of the monasteries, which had hitherto provided
some of those services,63 could only have aggravated the need.
Moreover, the Reformation itself, by altering people’s views of
the nature of religion, may have altered their understanding of
the function of philanthropy. Jones notes:

employment of uses and to what were evidently informal testamentary dispositions of
uses, Parliament had enacted the Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1536) (Eng.), which
declared that henceforth the holder of the use (the cestui que use) would be treated as
the owner of the legal estate. BURBY, supra note 55, at 9. This foreclosure by
Parliament of the possibility of testation proved so immediately unpopular that
Parliament enacted the Statute of Wills to undo the damage. See Jeffrey G. Sherman,
Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of Testamentary Restraints on
Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273, 1285, 1298 (1999).
59
SIMPSON, supra note 34, at 53.
60
Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 271.
61
Indeed, Parliament abolished the feudal incidents altogether in 1645,
during the days of the Commonwealth, and that abolition was reconfirmed at the time
of the Restoration. Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Seventeenth-Century Revolution in the
English Land Law, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 221, 241-42 (1995).
62
Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 274.
63
See LEONARD SHELFORD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF
MORTMAIN, AND CHARITABLE USES AND TRUSTS 42-43 (1842).
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The objects of charity were to become more secular as the majority of
Englishmen reflected less on the fate of their souls and became more
concerned with the worldly needs of their fellow men.64

Thus, a gift to a secular corporation for the maintenance
of a school or hospital came to appeal more to religiouslymotivated potential donors than did a gift to an ecclesiastical
body for the saying of masses or the upkeep of a chapel.
Funds bequeathed for charitable purposes were
frequently misapplied by the persons charged with their
administration, and few if any remedies were available to
enforce the restrictions that the charitable grantors had
originally sought to impose.65 As the need for private charitable
endowments increased and as those endowments came to be
more likely secular than spiritual, Parliament was moved to
enact statutes making the enforcement of charitable “uses”
easier to accomplish.66 Also at this time, Parliament, by various
acts, “dispensed with” the old statutory mortmain restrictions
applicable to land.67 Soon, property could be readily conveyed or
devised to charitable corporations or to individuals in trust for
any charitable use. But accompanying these liberalizing
changes applicable to secular charitable transfers came a fierce
determination, partly legislative and partly judicial, to ensure
that no charitable transfers could benefit the Roman Catholic
Church.68
It is tempting to view this anti-Catholic agenda as
merely another example of the sectarian bigotry we
occasionally see today in the United States, but such a view is
quite ahistorical. The impetus for this sixteenth century
hostility was not sectarianism but incipient nationalism. When
King Henry VIII, for dynastic and political reasons, determined
to abrogate all Papal authority within England,69 Parliament in
furtherance of that agenda enacted the so-called Act of
Supremacy (1534), declaring “that the King, our sovereign lord,
his heirs and successors, kings of this realm, shall be taken,
64

JONES, supra note 3, at 10.
See, e.g., id. at 10, 16. Remember, even before the English Reformation,
personal property could be disposed of by will and in mortmain. See supra note 34.
66
See, e.g., Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz., c. 4 (Eng.). See
generally JONES, supra note 3, at 16-56.
67
SHELFORD, supra note 63, at 42-57.
68
See infra text accompanying notes 72-79.
69
For a short discussion of the background of King Henry’s actions, see
Jeffrey G. Sherman, A Tax Teacher Tries Law and (Dramatic) Literature, 37 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 255, 275-78 (2004).
65
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accepted, and reputed the only supreme head in earth of the
Church of England.”70 By virtue of that enactment, one could no
longer remain simultaneously a scrupulous Catholic and a
loyal Englishman inasmuch as any profession that the Pope’s
ecclesiastical authority exceeded that of the King constituted
an act not simply of religious nonconformity but of political
treason. And the Church’s belligerent response to the schism
only strengthened the connection in the English mind between
Catholicism and violent subversion.71
The principal judicial tool for preventing charitably
inclined donors from benefiting the Catholic Church was the
doctrine of “superstitious uses.”72 By the end of Elizabeth’s
reign, secular charitable trusts had become actively favored by
chancellors,73 who
would . . . save charitable trusts despite defects in form or because of
incapacity of the feoffees to uses even though such defects or
incapacity would be fatal to other trusts. Moreover, statutes of
limitation were held ineffective to bar actions to enforce charitable
uses, a charitable use could not be destroyed by a tortious
feoffment[,] and charitable legacies were preferred on a marshalling
of assets.74

Chancellors also developed the doctrine of cy pres, which
continues to be applied even today. The trustees of a charitable
trust lack the authority to alter the terms of the transfer
merely because they think such an alteration would be
desirable. However, if an intended charitable trust would
otherwise fail because its purposes are or have become
impossible to achieve, the doctrine of cy pres allows courts to
70

Act of Supremacy, 26 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1534) (Eng.).
In 1570 Pope Pius V issued a bull, Regnans in Excelsis, declaring the
English monarch (Elizabeth I at the time) an excommunicate and purporting to absolve
her subjects of their sworn duty to obey her. See Michael deHaven Newsom, The
American Protestant Empire: A Historical Perspective, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 187, 222
(2001). Pius’s immediate successor went on to proclaim that the assassination of
Elizabeth would not be a mortal sin. See, e.g., CAROLLY ERICKSON, THE FIRST
ELIZABETH 318-19 (1997).
72
Courts’ employment of the word “superstitious” in this context may have
had a legislative genesis in the preamble to a 1547 statute—the Chantries Act, 1 Edw.
6, c. 14 (1547) (Eng.)—aimed at suppressing charitable endowments for private,
presumably Catholic, chapels. The preamble applied the words “superstition and
errors” to such matters as the belief in Purgatory and the saying of masses on behalf of
the dead. See JONES, supra note 3, at 12.
73
Obviously, the question arose then and has continued to arise as to what
trust purposes are to be considered “charitable.” This question lies beyond the scope of
this Article, but the interested reader is directed to WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. &
SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 390-92 (3d ed. 2004).
74
Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 277.
71
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authorize the trustee to apply the trust property to other, but
similar, charitable purposes if such an alteration would not
contravene the grantor’s intent.75
But none of these indulgent and curative policies
available to secular charitable trusts—including the prospect of
perpetual duration even after the “rule against perpetuities”
developed for private transfers76—were made available under
English law at the time if the purposes of the trust were found
to be “superstitious.” On the contrary, the trust was declared
void and forfeit to the Crown,77 albeit with the hope that the
Crown would then, as parens patriae, apply the forfeited funds
to some lawful charitable use, rather than simply adding them
to the royal coffers.78 Initially, “superstitious uses” meant uses
for the support of the beliefs, institutions, or clergy of the
Roman Catholic Church,79 but the understanding of the term
expanded over the years to include trusts for the benefit of such
other non-Anglican religions as Unitarianism80 and Judaism.81
Indeed, the doctrine of “superstitious uses” continued to be
employed to strike down trusts for the benefit of non-Anglican
religions even after English law was changed to officially
“tolerate” those religions,82 although an occasional court might
“save” the superstitious trust by applying cy pres and directing
the trustees to use the trust funds for an Anglican purpose that
the court considered similar.83
The doctrine of superstitious uses has survived in
English law, but not as a tool to invalidate, on a per se basis,
trusts for the benefit of a minority religion. Rather, the
doctrine has survived (and is applied under American law as
75
For a historical discussion of the doctrine of cy pres, see Joseph Willard,
Illustrations of the Origin of Cy Près, 8 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1894).
76
Pursuant to the rule against perpetuities, all the beneficiaries’ interests
under a private trust must vest or fail within the period of the Rule, but a charitable
trust may continue in perpetuity. 4A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 365
n.1 (William Franklin Fratcher ed., 4th ed. 1989).
77
JONES, supra note 3, at 13.
78
Id. at 77.
79
See id. at 82-87.
80
Attorney-General v. Pearson, 3 Mer. 353, 353, 36 Eng. Rep. 135. 136
(1817).
81
Da Costa v. De Paz, 1 Dick. 258, 258-59, 21 Eng. Rep. 268, 268 (1754).
82
As late as 1854, a gift for the saying of masses was held void as being
intended for a superstitious use. Heath v. Chapman, 2 Drew. 417, 426, 61 Eng. Rep.
781, 784-85 (1854).
83
See, e.g., Da Costa, 1 Dick. at 258, 21 Eng. Rep. at 268 (modifying a trust
originally intended to support instruction in the Jewish religion to support a foundling
hospital whose inmates were to be instructed in the Christian religion).
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well), albeit without the pejorative word “superstitious,” as a
useful tool for invalidating trusts that neither confer a public
benefit84 nor support definitely identifiable individuals.85 In the
1923 English Chancery case of In re Hummeltenberg,86 the
testator had bequeathed a substantial sum in trust for the
purpose of “training and developing suitable persons, male and
female, as mediums.” The trust was a perpetuity and therefore
had to be declared invalid unless it was found to be charitable;87
and to be classified as charitable, a trust must be designed to
confer some sort of significant public benefit.88 The court, after
expressing its understanding that a medium is “an individual
who professes to act as an intermediate for communication
between the living and the spirits of persons now dead,” held
that the training of mediums did not confer a public benefit and
that the trust was therefore invalid.89 While the court did not
go so far as to call mediums frauds or to call spiritualism
superstition,90 it did liken the testator’s intention to “the
84
See Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867). To be considered
charitable, a trust must benefit

an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts
under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from
disease, suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves in
life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise
lessening the burdens of government.
Id. at 556; accord GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 369 (rev. 2d ed. 1991).
85
A private trust, unlike a charitable trust, must have definitely identifiable
individual beneficiaries to be valid. If no individual beneficiaries can be identified, then
no one has standing to enforce the trust; and if no one has standing to enforce the
trust, then the putative trustee is not bound by any fiduciary constraints. And if the
putative trustee is not bound by any fiduciary constraints, she is not a trustee and
therefore no trust exists. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 51819 (7th ed. 2005). In the case of a charitable trust, however, the state attorney-general,
or some other designated public official, has standing to enforce the trust, so
identifiable individual beneficiaries are unnecessary. MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note
73, at 389.
86
[1923] 1 Ch. 237, All Eng. Rep. 49.
87
See supra note 76.
88
See supra note 84.
89
In re Hummeltenberg, [1923] 1 Ch. at 242, All Eng. Rep. at 51.
90
The Supreme Court of Michigan invalidated a will that bequeathed the
bulk of the testator’s estate “to be used as a nucleus in founding, building and
equipping a home for poor and aged mediums.” O’Dell v. Goff, 112 N.W. 736, 737 (Mich.
1907). Such a bequest does not raise quite the same public policy issues as the will in
Hummeltenberg did, inasmuch as the O’Dell bequest was intended to benefit the
needy—a valid charitable aim—rather than to advance a particular doctrine. But there
was considerable evidence in O’Dell that the testator believed that his will was dictated
to him by spirits, and the court invalidated the entire will not on public policy grounds
but on the grounds of testamentary incapacity and undue influence. Id.
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promoting of all kinds of fantastic (though not unlawful) objects
of which the training of poodles to dance might be a mild
example;”91 and it hinted that, had the perpetuities objection
not been dispositive, it would have been at least open to the
argument that the trust was invalid on public policy grounds.92
How have English courts responded in modern times to
the kinds of trusts at which the anti-Catholic Tudor policies
were specially aimed: trusts to support the saying of masses for
the repose of souls? Courts continued to apply the
“superstitious uses” doctrine to invalidate such trusts until
1919,93 when the House of Lords overruled these longstanding
precedents and held that trusts for the saying of masses were
not “superstitious” and therefore could be valid trusts.94 There
still remained, however, the requirement that charitable trusts
provide a public benefit. As to this, courts held that trusts to
support the saying of masses were valid if the public (or a
significant portion of the public) had access to the masses95 but
invalid if the public was excluded.96 As to public masses, courts
were willing to give religious beliefs—even “minority” religious
beliefs—more allowance than they were willing to give belief in
mediums:
A religion can be regarded as beneficial without it being necessary to
assume that all its beliefs are true, and a religious service can be
regarded as beneficial to all those who attend it without it being
necessary to determine the spiritual efficacy of that service or to
accept any particular belief about it.97

But as to private masses, the public benefits postulated
to accrue from them—the beneficial public effects of
intercessory prayer and the edification of the public by
example—were held to be, respectively, incapable of proof and

91

In re Hummeltenberg, [1923] 1 Ch. at 242, All Eng. Rep. at 51.
If the perpetuities issue had not been dispositive (because, let us say, the
duration of the trust was expressly limited to twenty-one years), the court’s finding
that the trust was not charitable might still have supported a holding that the trust
was invalid if the trust did not have definitely identifiable beneficiaries. See supra note
85. For some reason, however, the court does not discuss this alternative rationale; it
mentions only public policy as an alternative rationale.
93
For examples of cases applying the “superstitious uses” doctrine as late as
the nineteenth century, see Heath v. Chapman, [1854] 2 Drew. 417; West v.
Shuttleworth, [1835] 2 Myl. & K. 684.
94
Bourne v. Keane, [1919] A.C. 815, 926.
95
In re Hetherington, [1990] Ch. 1, 13 (1989).
96
Gilmour v. Coats, [1949] A.C. 426, 442-55 (H.L.).
97
Id. at 459.
92
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too intangible.98 That these invalidated trusts for private
masses bear some resemblance to the private chantries
condemned and invalidated as superstitious by the Chantries
Act of 1547 is interesting but not cause for disquiet.99 The
modern English courts’ distinction between publicly accessible
and private religious observance is neutral as to religious
content and treats religious belief no differently from any other
belief that is unsusceptible of proof,100 while the sixteenth
century statute was—by its design and in its effect—entirely
sectarian.
B.

Later English Mortmain Law: A Private Law Response

The early English mortmain law, just discussed, dealt
with a public law problem: the erosion of the feudal
aristocracy’s privileges. But this Article is concerned with a
private law problem that has outlasted feudalism: individual
testators who allow charitable inclinations to outweigh
supposed obligations to the natural objects of their bounty.
Both post-feudal English legislators and their American
counterparts responded to this private law concern by enacting
statutes
to prevent undue influence and imposition upon pious and feeble
minds in their last moments, and to check that unhappy propensity,
which sometimes is found to exist under a bigotted enthusiasm, and
the desire to gain fame as a religious devotee and benefactor, at the
expense of all the natural claims of blood and parental duty to
children.101

98

See Giles v. McDonnell, [1989] Ch. 133 Sol. J. 457.
See supra note 72.
100
Unique among American jurisdictions, the District of Columbia had a
mortmain statute that imposed restrictions on bequests to clergy or religious
institutions like churches but not on bequests to charitable, educational, or artistic
institutions, even those operated by religious institutions. See Estate of French v.
Doyle, 365 A.2d 621, 622 (D.C. 1976). Thus, a bequest to a semi-cloistered order of nuns
was held invalid, McInerney v. District of Columbia, 355 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1965),
while a bequest to the Little Sisters of the Poor was held valid. In re Estate of Susan
Evelyn Murray, No. 29831 (D.C. Dec. 26, 1924) (cited in Estate of French, 365 A.2d at
622). The District of Columbia statute was later held unconstitutional. Estate of
French, 365 A.2d at 625. See infra text accompanying notes 174-176.
101
This passage comes from an anonymous “Note I” printed as an appendix to
Philadelphia Baptist Ass’n v. Hart’s Executors, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1819) [hereinafter
Note I, Phila. Baptist Ass’n]. This appendix is published (and separately paginated) at
the end of Volume 17 of United States Reports; the quoted passage appears on page 23
of this appendix. Professor Brody identifies Mr. Justice Story as the author of this
anonymous Note. See Brody, supra note 47, at 907.
99
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In 1736, long after the medieval mortmain restrictions
were “dispensed with,”102 the English Parliament enacted what
we know as the Modern Law of Mortmain.103 It was enacted at a
time of rampant anti-clericalism in England, a time when
many “feared that the clergy would emulate what they thought
to be the example of their medieval predecessors and terrorise
them into making death-bed devises” to religious causes.104 But
the statute continued in operation long after this wave of anticlericalism faded, for the logic and function of the statute was
neither to prevent increases in the Church’s wealth nor to curb
testators’ attempts at gratifying their vanity through pious
acts. Rather, the statute was designed to “strike down the
death-bed charitable devise which deprived the heir of land
deemed to be his natural right.”105 Among other things, the Act
prohibited the conveyance of lands (or the conveyance of
personalty to be applied to the purchase of lands) for charitable
uses unless
[a] the conveyance [was] by deed signed, sealed, and delivered in the
presence of two or more witnesses at least twelve months before the
death of the donor or grantor; [b] the deed [was] enrolled in the high
Court of Chancery within six months after its execution; [c] in the
case of the transfer of stocks to be laid out in the purchase of lands,
such stocks [were] transferred in the [corporate] books kept for that
purpose six months before the death of the donor or grantor; and [d]
the conveyance [was to] take effect in possession forthwith on its
making . . ., without power of revocation . . . .106

Observe that, inasmuch as no devise could possibly
satisfy these conditions, the effect of the statute was to bar
devises of land to charity.107 But this bar operated quite
differently from the medieval and Tudor mortmain restrictions.
Under the earlier mortmain rules, an improper devise to
charity was not void but merely voidable;108 only if the lord or
the King exercised his right of entry would the land be
forfeited.109 The 1736 statute, on the other hand, rendered such

102

See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
Mortmain Act, 9 Geo. 2, c. 36 (1736).
104
JONES, supra note 3, at 109.
105
Id. at 117-18; see Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 281.
106
Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 284.
107
And the fourth restriction effectively barred inter vivos conveyances of
remainders to charity. Inter vivos transfers had to be outright and immediate.
108
See supra note 50.
109
See Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 278, 288.
103
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devises void absolutely.110 Furthermore, the 1736 statute—like
all American mortmain statutes that came after it—
contemplated that such improperly devised land would pass to
the testator’s heirs (or residuary devisees) rather than
escheating to the public fisc.111
Several comparative observations may usefully be made
at this point. First, in the decades between the 1601 enactment
of the Statute of Charitable Uses and the 1736 enactment of
the Mortmain Act, English courts came to favor charitable
devises and were inclined to take an expansive view as to what
transfers qualified as “charitable” so that such transfers would
enjoy the special protections afforded charitable donations.112 In
contrast, after the 1736 Act, taking an expansive view of what
constituted “charity” endangered more transfers by bringing
them within the invalidating reach of the statute;113 and the
same possibility of endangerment existed under the American
mortmain statutes that we shall discuss shortly. Second, the
1736 Act dealt only with transfers of land, not transfers of
personalty: an arbitrary distinction (since the feudal incidents
had been abolished114) that allowed a charitably inclined
testator to frustrate Parliament and disappoint his heirs by
converting all his land to personalty before executing his will.
On the other hand, few American mortmain statutes treated
land differently from personalty.115 Third, while the 1736 Act
invalidated all testamentary transfers of land to charity, it
invalidated inter vivos transfers of land only if they were made
less than one year before the transferor’s death.116 Parliament
seems to have assumed that a landowner was unlikely to make
improvident land-transfers that stood to jeopardize his
standard of living. Since testamentary transfers do not reduce
a transferor’s wealth, all testamentary transfers came within
110

Id. at 284.
See JONES, supra note 3, at 113-19. For example, suppose a testator in her
will devised Blackacre to Charity A, £10,000 to Charity B without restrictions, and the
residue of her estate to individual C. Upon application of the 1736 rule, Blackacre
would become part of the residue and pass to C; it would not escheat to the Crown.
112
See Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 277.
113
See JONES, supra note 3, at 107-08.
114
See supra note 61.
115
Even today, some American jurisdictions restrict the amount of land that
may be held by the trustees of a charitable or benevolent association. See, e.g., VA.
CODE ANN. § 57-20 (2006) (five acres); see also MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-11-33 (2006)
(effectively prohibiting religious societies from owning land other than that reasonably
related to certain enumerated institutional purposes).
116
See Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 284.
111
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the reach of the statute. But since inter vivos transfers do
reduce a transferor’s wealth, no special restrictions were
needed unless the landowner was so close to death that his selfinterest could not be relied upon as a check on his
improvidence. American mortmain statutes, on the other hand,
rarely applied to inter vivos transfers at all.
C.

American Mortmain Law—A Similar Private Law
Response

The 1736 English Mortmain Law never had any force in
the American colonies.117 But American judges and legislators
undoubtedly knew of the 1736 Law, and after the founding of
our republic many of them thought the English example
worthy of emulation. Justice Story, for instance, urged
American legislators to follow the “enlightened” example of the
English Parliament by enacting legislation to prevent the
“imposition upon pious and feeble minds in their last moments”
and to restrain charitable impulses when they threaten “the
natural claims of blood and parental duty to children.”118 For
without such legislation, American courts often had to watch
helplessly as charitable bequests shattered family members’
expectations.
In Doughten v. Vandever, for example, a testator had
left almost her entire estate to a number of charities and
almost nothing to her blood relatives.119 Although the will
described the intended charitable legatees in vague and
inaccurate language, the court upheld the bequests
nonetheless, a result quite consistent with the traditional
judicial favoritism shown to attempted charitable transfers.120
But the court expressed its disapproval of the testator’s
intention to leave all to charity at the expense of her family.
The court stated:
There is nothing in the will . . ., with respect to these charitable
bequests, at the expense of her relatives in blood, that meets the
approval of my judgment. Her example in this respect I would not
commend as worthy of imitation; and nothing but a sense of duty,
which compels me to follow the law as expounded by courts of equity,
has caused me to give an interpretation to the provisions of her
117

Brody, supra note 47, at 906; Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 297 (citing
Attorney-Gen. v. Stewart, (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 895, 900-01).
118
See supra note 101.
119
Doughten v. Vandever, 5 Del. Ch. 51, 51-52 (1875).
120
See supra note 3; supra text accompanying notes 62-74.
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will . . . by which her heirs at law are excluded from the benefit of
sharing her estate.121

Consequently, American legislators, some at least as
early as 1848, began to take Justice Story’s advice.122 For
example, the Supreme Court of California, writing in 1907,
explained the purpose of that state’s mortmain statute:
It is that a man’s fears or superstition, or his death-bed hope of
purchasing a blissful immortality, shall not be allowed to influence
the disposition which he may thus make of his property, to the injury
of his heirs.123

American mortmain statutes, all of them since
repealed,124 generally fell within one of two categories:
(1) statutes that limited the percentage of a testator’s estate
that she was permitted to bequeath to charity (we shall use the
term “percentage restrictions” to refer to this first group);
and, more commonly, (2) statutes that annulled charitable
bequests if the testator died only a short time after executing
the will (we shall use the term “deathbed restrictions” to
refer to the second).125 Among the percentage restrictions were
Iowa’s (invalid in excess of twenty-five percent)126 and New
York’s (invalid in excess of fifty percent).127 Among the
deathbed restrictions were California’s (30 days),128 Florida’s
(6 months),129 and Idaho’s (120 days).130 And a few statutes—
121

Doughten, 5 Del. Ch. at 77.
See Shirley Norwood Jones, The Demise of Mortmain in the United States,
12 MISS. C. L. REV. 407, 409 (1992).
123
In re Lennon’s Estate, 92 P. 870, 871 (Cal. 1907).
124
In 1970, eleven American jurisdictions still had mortmain statutes:
California, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Mississippi, Montana,
New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. All of them have since been repealed or held
unconstitutional. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 9.7 cmt. c, note 3 (2003).
125
Strictly speaking, these American statutes were not mortmain statutes,
inasmuch as they did not purport to limit the amount of wealth that a charitable body
might accumulate. See Kramer v. Eckart (In re Estate of Eckart), 348 N.E.2d 905, 909
(N.Y. 1976). Nonetheless, it is common to use the word “mortmain” in the context of
these statutes, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 9.7 cmt. (2003); Michael G. Walsh, Annotation, Modern Status, Validity,
and Effect of Mortmain Statutes, 6 A.L.R.4th 603 § 2(a) (1981), and I shall continue to
do so in this Article.
126
IOWA PROB. CODE § 633.266 (repealed 1980).
127
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.3 (repealed 1981).
128
CAL. PROB. CODE § 41 (repealed 1971).
129
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.803, invalidated by Shriners’ Hosp. for Crippled
Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 68-69 (Fla. 1990).
130
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-615 (repealed 1994).
122
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such as Ohio’s—combined the features of both groups (invalid
in excess of twenty-five percent if the testator died less than six
months after executing the will).131 The ostensible targets of the
percentage restrictions were “excesses of piety,”132 while those
of the deathbed restrictions were bequests generated by “the
[deathbed] fears of the faithful.”133 Both kinds of restrictions did
succeed in reaching their targets, but not without difficulties
that made enforcement inconsistent and problematic.
For example, did the statutes render the offending
charitable bequest absolutely void or merely voidable if
challenged by someone with standing to do so? Under the 1736
English statute that served as a model for American
legislation,134 such bequests were void.135 Under the American
statutes, however, such bequests generally were held merely to
be voidable. The Iowa mortmain statute, for instance, provided:
No devise or bequest to a [not-for-profit corporation] shall be valid in
excess of one-fourth of the testator’s estate after the payment of
debts, if a spouse, child, child of a deceased child, or parent survive
the testator.136

Read literally, this statute provides that if a specified relative
survives the testator, the excess bequest is automatically void,
even if none of those relatives actually files an objection.
131
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.06 (repealed 1985). In addition to
invalidating all charitable bequests made within thirty days of death, the California
statute invalidated even charitable bequests made more than thirty days before death
to the extent that such earlier bequests exceeded one-third of the estate. CAL. PROB.
CODE § 41 (repealed by 1971 Cal. Stat. ch. 1395).
132
See supra note 59.
133
See supra note 18 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of Florida
stated that Florida’s mortmain statute was “obviously [designed] to prevent testators
who may be laboring under the apprehension of impending death from disposing of
their estates to the exclusion of those who are, or should be, the natural objects of the
testator’s bounty.” Taylor v. Payne, 17 So. 2d 615, 618 (Fla. 1944), overruled by
Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 70 (Fla. 1990).
134
The case of universities provides an interesting illustration of the extent to
which American legislators were indebted to their English progenitors. When the 1736
English statute was being debated, Parliament granted exemptions for transfers made
to the universities and colleges at Oxford and Cambridge and to the schools of Eton,
Westminster, and Winchester, since Parliament considered these institutions to be the
only public foundations “either useful or necessary in this Kingdom.” JONES, supra note
3, at 111. Florida legislators included a similar exemption in their state’s mortmain
statute, which by its terms did not apply to “devises or bequests made to institutions of
higher learning.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.19; see also CAL. PROB. CODE § 42 (repealed
1971). (The California repealing legislation exempts certain public and private
educational institutions from the restrictions of the state’s mortmain statute. 1971 Cal.
Stat. ch. 1395 § 1.)
135
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
136
IOWA PROB. CODE § 633.266 (repealed 1980).
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Nonetheless, the Iowa courts construed the statute to make the
charitable bequest merely voidable, at the instance of one or
more of the specified relatives.137 California courts—noting the
public policy “in favor of charities and against the concept of
mortmain”—reached a similar result under the California
statute.138 And the Florida mortmain statute quite explicitly
stated that a charitable bequest could be avoided only if one or
more of the lineal descendants or a spouse who would receive
any interest in the devise, if avoided, “file[d] written notice to
this effect in the administration proceeding within 4 months
after the date letters [testamentary were] issued.”139 The
mortmain statutes of a few states, however, contained no
references to enumerated relatives, and accordingly those
statutes were held to render the offending bequests void
absolutely inasmuch as courts saw no textual basis for tying
invalidity to the claims of particular persons.140
D.

Why Mortmain Statutes Proved Unworkable

Even in the majority of states whose mortmain statutes
were dependent on challenges brought by enumerated
relatives, some courts required not only that the challenger be
one of the enumerated relatives but also that she be entitled to
take an additional share of property in the event the challenge
was successful. In other words, an objectant’s standing
depended not simply on being one of the enumerated relatives
but also on enjoying the prospect of benefiting from the
objection. For example, suppose a state’s mortmain statute was
interpreted to require that an objection be filed by a spouse or
descendant before a charitable bequest might be successfully
challenged. A testator’s will provided, “I bequeath $100,000 to
Charity X and the residue of my estate to my niece.” The
testator, who was also survived by a son, died less than a
month after executing the will, so the charitable bequest was
voidable under the mortmain statute. But even if the
137
See Watson v. Manley, 130 N.W.2d 693, 696-97 (Iowa 1964), and the cases
cited therein.
138
McCormack v. Catholic Church Extension Soc’y of the United States of Am.
(In re Estate of Reardon), 52 Cal. Rptr. 68, 73 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Villa v. Gutierrez
(In re Estate of Gutierrez), 33 Cal. Rptr. 593, 598 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
139
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.803, invalidated by Shriners’ Hosp. for Crippled
Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 68-69 (Fla. 1990).
140
See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 15-2-615 (repealed 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7211-334 (declared unconstitutional in In re Estate of Kinyon, 615 P.2d 174 (Mont. 1980)).
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charitable bequest were successfully challenged, the challenge
would profit the son nothing inasmuch as the $100,000 would
drop into residue for the niece’s benefit, rather than passing by
intestacy to the son. The niece would benefit from a successful
challenge, but she lacked standing to bring one inasmuch as
she was not an enumerated relative. Consequently, the
deathbed charitable bequest could not be reached under this
hypothetical statute.141
A testator might use a substitutionary gift as a device
for thwarting such a mortmain statute: for example, “I
bequeath $100,000 to Charity X, but if this bequest should for
any reason be declared invalid, then I bequeath that $100,000
to Individual A. And I bequeath the residue of my estate to my
son.” Even though the son would ordinarily have standing to
maintain an action to avoid the charitable bequest under this
hypothetical mortmain statute inasmuch as he was both an
enumerated relative and a residuary legatee, in this case he
would lack standing inasmuch as a successful challenge to
Charity X’s bequest would not benefit the son but only
Individual A. Consequently, the charitable bequest would
survive any attack brought pursuant to this mortmain
statute.142 The Iowa rule, by contrast, did not deprive an
enumerated relative of standing even though she would not
derive any pecuniary benefit from a successful objection,143 and
thus the charity would indeed lose, but Individual A, rather
than the objecting son, would gain. And if the testator carefully
chose Individual A, who was in fact a director or officer of
Charity X, even the successful contest under the Iowa
mortmain statute would not thwart the testator’s charitable
intentions inasmuch as Individual A would be expected to use
his inheritance to benefit the same charity that the testator
wanted to benefit.144
141
See Whelpley v. Union Trust Bank of St. Petersburg (In re Estate of Lane),
186 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
142
See, e.g., Syster v. Roman Catholic Bishop of San Diego (In re Estate of
Sanderson), 375 P.2d 37, 40 (Cal. 1962); Rauf v. Salvation Army at Ocala (In re Estate
of Rauf), 213 So. 2d 31, 32 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Cent. Nat’l Bank of Cleveland v.
Morris, 222 N.E.2d 674 (Ohio Prob. Ct.), aff’d, 227 N.E.2d 418 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967).
143
See, e.g., Davis v. Davis (In re Estate of Davis), 114 N.W.2d 314, 317 (Iowa
1962).
144
The device of naming a charity’s officer as a substitute taker worked
splendidly to protect the charitable bequest in an Iowa-type jurisdiction, as long as the
gift over was to Individual A in his individual capacity so that the will did not purport
to impose on Individual A any legal obligation to use the inheritance to benefit the
charity. See, e.g., Durkee v. Smith, 156 N.Y.S. 920, 922-23 (App. Div.), aff’d, 114 N.E.
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The availability of the substitutionary gift technique
provided testators with “a ready instrument” for protecting
charitable bequests from successful challenges pursuant to a
mortmain statute by depriving potential contestants of
standing.145 It is difficult to believe that courts’ allowance of this
technique was consistent with legislatures’ intent, especially
where the substitute takers were officers of the charitable
legatee. To the extent legislatures wanted to restrain bequests
generated by the deathbed fears of the faithful, they could
hardly have approved of this technique when the inclusion of
the substitutionary gift might have been prompted by the same
undue influence or the same deathbed fears that prompted the
charitable bequest. Nonetheless, the availability of this
technique—the ease with which a mortmain statute could be

1066 (N.Y. 1916). I have some doubts as to the soundness of citing this (or any) New
York case as an illustration of the Iowa rule, for the New York decisions puzzle me. The
result in the Durkee case is explainable only if New York followed the Iowa rule,
inasmuch as the challenger was able to get a charitable bequest struck down even
though substitute takers, not the challenger himself, benefited from the successful
challenge. Yet a later case, In re Estate of Fitzgerald, 339 N.Y.S.2d 333, 337 (Sur. Ct.
1972), held that a substitutionary gift deprived an enumerated relative of his standing
to contest a charitable gift; curiously, the Fitzgerald court cited the Durkee case in
support of that proposition, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 337, even though Durkee seems to have
held that such a relative did have standing. However, another New York case, In re
Logasa’s Estate, appears to disagree with Fitzgerald and agree with Durkee. 297 N.Y.S.
730, 731-32 (Sur. Ct. 1937). While the Logasa opinion is not so clear as it might be with
regard to the facts, the case appears to have held that an enumerated relative could
bring a challenge under the mortmain statute even though he would not benefit from
the redirected money. Id.
The Iowa rule—granting standing to a petitioner who does not stand to
benefit from a successful mortmain challenge—is inconsistent with over a century of
wills law. In order to have standing to contest a will, an action quite analogous to
challenging a charitable bequest pursuant to a mortmain statute, the contestant must
show that a successful contest would increase the share of the decedent’s property that
would devolve to her. If the invalidation of the will would not be of direct pecuniary
benefit to her, she lacks standing to contest. See, e.g., Parker ex rel. Ames v. Reeves,
553 So. 2d 570, 572 (Ala. 1989); Fuqua v. Holt (In re Eskridge’s Estate), 125 P.2d 527,
528 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942); In re Shephard’s Estate, 32 A. 1040, 1042 (Pa. 1895).
145
Note, Standing to Contest Wills Violating Charitable Bequest Statutes, 50
COLUM. L. REV. 94, 96 (1950). Indeed, the courts of at least one state consistently held
that a testator bent on circumventing the statute need not have named a substitute
taker; all she had to do was declare in the will that the relatives enumerated in the
statute should receive no portion of her estate either by will or by intestacy. See In re
Kramer v. Eckart (In re Estate of Eckart), 348 N.E.2d 905, 909-10 (N.Y. 1976). It
should be noted, however, that some states, regardless of the existence of any
mortmain statutes, do not permit a testator to disinherit her heirs simply by fiat; they
require a testator bent on such disinheritance to make an effective bequest of her
estate to other persons. See, e.g., Cook v. Estate of Seeman, 858 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Ark.
1993); Clark v. Baxter (In re Estate of Baxter), 827 P.2d 184, 186 (Okla. Civ. App.
1992).
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circumvented—lay behind at least one legislature’s decision to
repeal that state’s mortmain statute.146
Mortmain statutes in the form of percentage restrictions
frequently presented valuation and calculation issues. How, for
example, should one value the bequest of a future interest to a
charity? Suppose a hypothetical mortmain statute bars
charitable bequests in excess of one-third of a testator’s net
probate estate. A particular testator with a net probate estate
of $300,000 bequeaths $101,000 in trust and the residue to her
children outright. The terms of the trust provide that the
income from the trust property is to be paid to Individual X for
ten years, and then the remainder in the trust is to be
distributed outright to Charity Y. At least one court held that
since it could not determine as of the testator’s death the
amount that would ultimately pass to Charity Y, it had to wait
until the trust terminated to see how much actually ended up
going to the charity.147 So, under such an interpretation, if the
principal of our hypothetical trust remains at $101,000 until
final distribution, the charitable bequest will be found
retroactively to have violated the mortmain statute. Not only is
this valuation method administratively unsatisfactory
inasmuch as it requires the beneficiaries to wait many years
before they know who inherits what, the method is also
doctrinally wrong. While it is certainly true that $101,000 is
more than one-third of the $300,000 over which the testator
had testamentary control, the testator did not bequeath the
entire $101,000 to charity. She bequeathed only a remainder
146
Margaret Valentine Turano, Practice Commentaries, in MCKINNEY’S
CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK; see N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-3.3
(repealed 1981). I find it interesting that the New York legislature regarded the
substitutionary gift as a sure-fire method of undermining the mortmain statute,
inasmuch as at least two New York cases—Durkee and Logasa—held that a
substitutionary gift to a nonrelative does not deprive an enumerated relative of
standing to object to the charitable bequest. See supra note 144. Perhaps the
legislature had only the more recent Fitzgerald case in mind. See In re Estate of
Fitzgerald, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 337. Or perhaps the legislature believed that most
enumerated relatives, even if they had standing to object, would not spend the time or
money necessary to press their objection when any success would enrich the substitute
taker rather than themselves. In Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children v. Zrillic,
the Florida Supreme Court, in an opinion declaring Florida’s mortmain statute
unconstitutional, noted the ease with which the statute could be circumvented through
the use of substitutionary gifts. 563 So. 2d 64, 69 (Fla. 1990).
147
See McCormack v. Catholic Church Extension Soc’y of the United States of
Am. (In re Estate of Reardon), 52 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966). This valuation
method was employed by the trial court as reported in the appellate court’s opinion. Id.
at 70-71. The appellate court reversed the trial court on grounds unrelated to this
valuation issue. Id. at 76.
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interest in that $101,000; the income from the $101,000 for ten
years was bequeathed to an individual. If we assume an
interest rate of 5 percent and employ standard actuarial
valuation techniques, the present value of X’s income interest
in that $101,000 is about $39,000, and the present value of the
charitable bequest is about $62,000: well within the one-third
limit.148
Even if a court is willing to use actuarial valuation
techniques,149 carrying out the statute may require considerable
ingenuity. Suppose, in our previous example, the testator had
bequeathed $200,000 to the trust instead of $101,000. The
present value of the charitable remainder would be about
$123,000: clearly in excess of one-third of the estate. If we
reduced the amount of the bequest in trust to $163,000, that
would lower the value of the charitable remainder to $100,000,
which satisfies the mortmain statute. But lowering the trust
corpus to $163,000 (that is, removing $37,000 from the
$200,000 pecuniary bequest and adding that $37,000 to
residue) would reduce more than just the charitable bequest. It
would reduce X’s income interest as well, and X is an
individual, not a charity. Perhaps the soundest solution would
be to divide the $200,000 pecuniary bequest into two trusts:
one in the amount of $163,000, with the income going to X for
ten years and the remainder going to Charity Y; and another in
the amount of $37,000, with the income going to X for ten years
and the remainder going to testator’s children (the residuary
legatees).
Mortmain statutes in the form of percentage restrictions
also presented interpretive problems whenever the testator
owned property in more than one state. Under the customary
principles of conflict of laws, the law of the situs determines the
effectiveness of an attempted devise of land.150 For example,

148
Sometimes actuarial valuation techniques cannot be used to calculate a
remainder’s present value, as where the trustee is authorized in its discretion to make
corpus distributions to the life income beneficiary. See Herrington v. Nation Found. for
Infantile Paralysis (In re Estate of Nicely), 44 Cal. Rptr. 804, 807 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1965).
149
See, e.g., Upole v. Roberts (In re Estate of Roberts), 437 N.E.2d 1205, 1208
(Ohio Ct. App. 1980).
150
See In re Gracey’s Estate, 253 P. 921, 924 (Cal. 1927); Biederman v.
Guzman Ramos ex rel. Estate of Barteau (In re Estate of Barteau), 736 So. 2d 57, 58
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Hyman v. Glover (In re Estate of Hannan), 523 N.W.2d 672,
674 (Neb. 1994). Devolution of personal property is governed by the law of the
decedent’s domicile at death. Hemingway v. McGehee (In re Estate of Chrichton), 228
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where a Missouri domiciliary owned land located in Illinois, the
land was held to pass by intestacy even though he left a will
that was valid in Missouri, because an Illinois statute treated
the will as having been revoked by the testator’s subsequent
marriage.151 Consequently, if State One has a deathbed
restriction mortmain statute while State Two has none, and if
a testator domiciled in State One makes a deathbed charitable
devise of land located in State Two, the devise will not be
voidable under State One’s mortmain statute. And similarly, if
a testator domiciled in State Two makes a deathbed charitable
devise of land located in State One, the devise will be voidable
under State One’s mortmain statute. But suppose State One’s
mortmain statute is a percentage restriction; will the State
Two land be taken into account for purposes of determining
whether State One’s percentage restriction has been exceeded?
New York law, to take one example, answered that last
question affirmatively. First, said the Court of Appeals, the
value of all the testator’s property, wherever located, must be
ascertained.152 Then the value of all property not subject to New
York law (that is, out-of-state real property and, in the case of a
nondomiciliary, all personal property153) but bequeathed to
charity must be ascertained.154 If that second total equals or
exceeds fifty percent of the first total, any charitable bequests
of property subject to New York law (that is, New York realty
and, in the case of a New York domiciliary, all personal
property) are voidable under New York’s mortmain statute.155
But if that second total is less than fifty percent of the first
total, so much property subject to New York law may pass to
charities as will bring the total passing to charity up to fifty
percent of the first total.156 Thus, if a New York domiciliary’s
estate consisted of $60,000 of New York real estate, $40,000 of
New Jersey real estate, and $50,000 of personalty, and if the
testator’s will devised all his land to charity, New York courts
would allow not more than $35,000 of the New York realty to
N.E.2d 799, 806, 808, 823 (N.Y. 1967); Howard v. Reynolds, 283 N.E.2d 629, 630-31
(Ohio 1972).
151
Sternberg v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 68 N.E.2d 892, 894, 897-98 (Ill.
1946). Illinois law no longer provides that a testator’s marriage revokes his premarital
wills. See ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/4-7(b) (2007).
152
Decker v. Vreeland, 115 N.E. 989, 992 (N.Y. 1917).
153
See supra note 150.
154
Decker, 115 N.E. at 992.
155
Id.
156
Id.
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pass to charity free of New York’s mortmain statute.157 But this
result assumes that no New Jersey mortmain statute would
limit the effectiveness of the charitable devise of the New
Jersey land. If both states had a percentage mortmain
restriction, the process would be more complex still.
Mortmain statutes in the form of deathbed restrictions
presented fewer interpretive problems than mortmain statutes
in the form of percentage restrictions. The one persistent
problem common to the former but not to the latter was
deathbed wills that reaffirmed charitable bequests made before
the deathbed period began. Suppose a state’s mortmain statute
voids all charitable bequests made within six months of death.
Two years before her death, a testator executes Will #1, which
bequeaths $10,000 to Charity A and the residue to individual
X. One month before her death, the testator executes Will #2,
which (1) expressly revokes Will #1, (2) bequeaths $10,000 to
Charity A, and (3) bequeaths the residue to individual Y. Since
the purpose of deathbed restrictions is “to protect . . . against
the influences . . . [of the] last moments” that prompt a testator
to make charitable bequests “as a means of tranquilizing a
disturbed conscience,”158 one might argue that the statute ought
not to be applied in this case inasmuch as the charitable
bequest predates those “last moments.” Indeed, if the statute
did apply in these circumstances, testators in their last
illnesses might thereafter refrain from making needed changes
in the noncharitable portions of their wills lest charitable
bequests in prior wills lose their “grandfathered” status. On the
other hand, the testator in our example might have intended,
when she drew Will #2, to revoke the charitable bequest
altogether and was dissuaded from doing so only by those
“influences of the last moments.” Under this new assumption,
one would think that the statute ought to be applied.
And the case I have presented so far is relatively
easy. Suppose we hold in this case that the $10,000 bequest to
Charity A is indeed “grandfathered” under the mortmain
statute and therefore valid. Would a $15,000 bequest to
Charity A in Will #2 be similarly grandfathered? Grandfathered only to the extent of $10,000? And what about a
bequest of $10,000 to Charity B in Will #2 to replace the
157

The total value of the testator’s estate is $150,000, so fifty percent of that
amount equals $75,000. Since the $40,000 of New Jersey realty is effectively devised to
charity, not more than $35,000 of New York property may be so devised.
158
Stephenson v. Short, 92 N.Y. 433, 444-45 (1883).
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bequest to Charity A? Most mortmain statutes were silent on
these points. The mortmain statutes of at least two states,
however, Florida and Pennsylvania, contained language
intended to address these problems, but the language created
new problems of its own. Florida’s six-month deathbed
mortmain statute did not apply in cases where the “testator, by
his will duly executed immediately next prior to such
[deathbed] last will and more than six months before his death,
[had] made a valid charitable bequest or devise in substantially
the same amount for the same purpose or to the same
beneficiary.”159 The exception in the Pennsylvania statute was
for “an identical gift for substantially the same religious or
charitable purpose.”160 The Pennsylvania language was slightly
more specific as to amount than the Florida language
(“identical gift” is more specific than “substantially the same
amount”), while the Florida language was slightly more specific
as to purposes (“the same purpose” as compared with
“substantially the same . . . purpose”). But in each case the
more specific language was so specific that courts could hardly
have interpreted it strictly. For example, in In re Estate of
Rauf,161 the testator, more than six months before her death,
executed a will bequeathing the residue of her estate to two
charities: the Salvation Army of New York City and a Cancer
Fund in New York. Within six months of her death, she
executed a new will leaving the residue of her estate to three
charities: the Salvation Army at Ocala, Florida; the Marion
County Heart Association; and Father Flanagan’s Boys’
Home.162 The court held that the three residuary bequests in
the deathbed will were indeed “for the same purpose” as the
two residuary bequests in her prior will and therefore were
insulated from the reach of the mortmain statute, even though
the charities named in the later will were, with one exception,
not even close to identical with those named in the earlier
will.163

159
160
161
162
163

FLA. STAT. § 731.19 (repealed 1974).
See In re Estate of Prynn, 315 A.2d 265, 266 n.6 (Pa. 1974).
213 So. 2d 31 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
Id. at 32.
Id. at 32-33.
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Constitutional Objections to Mortmain Statutes

We have seen that the American mortmain statutes
were deeply flawed. They could be easily circumvented by
making inter vivos gifts or by designating alternative takers in
the event of invalidity. They presented extremely difficult
questions of interpretation. And they jeopardized estate
planning techniques (charitable lead trusts and charitable
remainder trusts, for example) that were needed to preserve a
family’s after-tax wealth. All of these were good reasons for
repealing the statutes, and most of them were in fact repealed
for reasons such as these.164 But a number of mortmain statutes
were held to be not merely unwise but unconstitutional: an
extreme and unwarranted holding.
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the state’s
mortmain statute165 violated the due process clauses of the Ohio
and U.S. constitutions because the distinction the statute made
between bequests executed within six months before death and
those executed more than six months before death was an
arbitrary, irrational distinction bearing no relation to whether
the particular bequest was the result of unsound judgment or
undue influence.166 That objection cannot reflect a correct
understanding of the requirements of due process inasmuch as
legislatures routinely draw distinctions based on age or time.
Some fifteen-year-olds are better drivers than some twentyyear-olds, but a state is nonetheless permitted to enact and
enforce an inflexible minimum driving age.167 Similarly, when
Congress, anxious to prevent Social Security spousal death
benefits from enriching partners in “sham marriages” entered
into solely for the purpose of obtaining these benefits, enacted a
164
See, e.g., supra note 146 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
reasons behind the repeal in 1960 of England’s modern mortmain statute, see
Oosterhoff, supra note 18, at 291-95.
165
See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
166
Shriners’ Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Hester, 492 N.E.2d 153, 156 (Ohio
1986). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania invalidated that state’s mortmain statute
on similar grounds. In re Estate of Cavill, 329 A.2d 503, 505-06 (Pa. 1974). “The statute
strikes down the charitable gifts of one in the best of health at the time of the execution
of his will and regardless of age if he chances to die in an accident 29 days later. On the
other hand, it leaves untouched the charitable bequests of another, aged and suffering
from a terminal disease, who survives the execution of his will by 31 days. Such a
combination of results can only be characterized as arbitrary.” Id. at 505-06; accord In
re Estate of Kinyon, 615 P.2d 174, 176 (Mont. 1980) (invalidating Montana’s mortmain
statute).
167
Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006 U.
ILL. L. REV. 571, 597 (2006).
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provision denying such benefits to surviving spouses whose
marriages had lasted less than nine months,168 the United
States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
provision, even though not all nine-month marriages are shams
and some sham marriages may last for more than nine
months.169 The Court reasoned:
[T]he question raised is not whether a statutory provision precisely
filters out those, and only those, who are in the factual position
which generated the [legislative] concern reflected in the statute.
Such a rule would ban all prophylactic provisions. . . . The question
is whether [the legislature], its concern having been reasonably
aroused by the possibility of an abuse which it legitimately desired
to avoid, could rationally have concluded both that a particular
limitation or qualification would protect against its occurrence, and
that the expense and other difficulties of individual determinations
justified the inherent imprecision of a prophylactic rule.170

When the Supreme Court of Florida invalidated that
state’s mortmain statute,171 it took the faulty Ohio view,
condemning as irrational the statutory distinction between
bequests made within six months before the testator’s death
and those made six months or more before the testator’s
death.172 The Florida court also condemned the statute’s
differentiation between bequests to charities and those to
individuals: “There is no reason to believe that testators need
more protection against charities than against unscrupulous
and greedy relatives, friends, or acquaintances.”173 And the
District of Columbia mortmain statute174 made a more
troubling distinction—unique among American mortmain
statutes175—between bequests to religious entities (invalid if
made within thirty days of the testator’s death) and bequests to
secular charities (valid regardless of when made). The District
of Columbia Court of Appeals, citing the irrationality of that
distinction, held that the statute violated the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment.176
168
169
170
171
172

42 U.S.C. § 416(c)(1)(E), (g)(1)(E) (2000).
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 777 (1975).
Id. at 777.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.803 (repealed 1991).
Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 70 (Fla.

1990).
173

Id. at 70.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 18-302 (repealed 1981).
175
See Estate of French v. Doyle, 365 A.2d 621, 622 n.3 (D.C. 1976), appeal
dismissed on other grounds, 434 U.S. 59 (1978).
176
Id. at 624-25.
174
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The District of Columbia’s unique mortmain distinction
between religious charities and secular charities might indeed
have raised constitutional questions concerning the freedom of
religion.177 However, a statutory rule distinguishing between all
charities on the one hand and all noncharities on the other does
not implicate First Amendment values. In the famous peyote
case, Employment Division v. Smith,178 the United States
Supreme Court held that “the right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the
law proscribes . . . conduct that his religion prescribes . . . .”179
But what about the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion
that the state mortmain statute’s charity/noncharity
distinction, because of its arbitrariness, violated not the free
exercise principle but the equal protection clause?180 Even if the
state’s purpose in enacting the statute is legitimate, “Equal
protection analysis,” said the Florida court, “requires that
classifications be neither too narrow nor too broad to achieve
[that] desired end.”181 The court reasoned that the mortmain
statute was simultaneously too narrow and too broad: too
narrow insofar as it failed to invalidate bequests to
unscrupulous noncharitable legatees who were guilty of
overreaching, and too broad insofar as it invalidated bequests
to charitable legatees who were innocent of overreaching.182
Was the Florida court correct in its equal protection analysis?
Since the right to bequeath one’s property is an
economic and not a fundamental right,183 proper equal

177

The trial court had found that the mortmain statute did indeed violate the
First Amendment, but the appellate court, finding the due process objection
determinative, expressly declined to consider the First Amendment issue. Id. at 623.
The issue of freedom of religion is discussed in more detail infra in the text
accompanying notes 325-378.
178
494 U.S. 872 (1990); see also infra text accompanying notes 326-331.
179
Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (internal punctuation and citations omitted); accord
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). “[A] law that is
neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental
interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious
practice.” Id. at 531.
180
Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1990).
181
Id. at 69-70.
182
Id. at 70.
183
In 1942, the United States Supreme Court famously declared:
Rights of succession to the property of a deceased, whether by will or by
intestacy, are of statutory creation, and the dead hand rules succession only
by sufferance. Nothing in the Federal Constitution forbids the legislature of a
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protection analysis rests with the so-called “rational basis”
test,184 and “rational basis” does not demand “mathematical
nicety.”185 In Dandridge v. Williams,186 for example, the State of
Maryland had imposed a $250 cap on the monthly amount of
need-based benefits that the state paid to any one family
pursuant to its Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(“AFDC”) program. Because the same dollar cap applied to both
large families and small ones, despite the presumably greater
financial need of the former, the petitioners argued that the
dollar cap “operate[d] to discriminate against them merely
because of the size of their families, in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”187 The
essence of the petitioners’ argument was one of overbreadth.
Maryland imposed the cap, in part, to limit the financial
benefits of unemployment and thereby encourage gainful
employment;188 yet, argued petitioners, the cap was imposed
even on families in which no one was employable: that is,
families who could not possibly respond to that statutory
incentive.189 (The statute was impliedly underbroad as well. If a
family’s actual needs were below the $250 cap, such a family’s
AFDC grants would equal their needs, so the statutory scheme
and its cap would in that case generate no effective pressure to
seek employment.) The United States Supreme Court rejected
state to limit, condition, or even abolish the power of testamentary
disposition over property within its jurisdiction.
Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942) (punctuation altered). In 1987, the
Court held that the federal government’s abrogation of the right to bequeath certain
fractional interests in aboriginal tribal lands amounted to a “taking” of property that
required compensation pursuant to the Fifth Amendment. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S.
704, 717-18 (1987). Some scholars regarded Hodel as a signal that the Court was
retreating from its 1942 rejection of a constitutional basis for a right to bequeath, while
others read Hodel as creating only a minor exception to Irving Trust. See Sherman,
supra note 58, at 1288-89. Noteworthy is the fact that state courts, long after Hodel
was decided, continued to declare—and to cite pre-Hodel cases—that the right to
bequeath is not a natural right but rather a statutory privilege. See, e.g., Estate of
Della Sala v. Father Flanagan’s Boys’ Home, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 569, 572 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999); Thompson v. Hardy, 43 S.W.3d 281, 285 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000); In re Estate of
Long, 600 A.2d 619, 622 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
184
See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1987) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970).
185
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). “Strict
scrutiny” analysis does require mathematical nicety, often phrased as a requirement
that the legislature choose “the least restrictive means of achieving” its end. Thomas v.
Review Bd. Of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
186
397 U.S. 471 (1970).
187
Id. at 475.
188
Id. at 483.
189
Id. at 486.
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the petitioners’ constitutional challenge, pointing out that
while overbreadth could be a constitutionally fatal flaw in
statutes impinging on First Amendment rights, it was an
irrelevant consideration under the “rational basis” standard
applicable to economic or social regulation.190
[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must
choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking
the problem at all. It is enough that the State’s action be rationally
based and free from invidious discrimination.191

A state has a legitimate interest in regulating the
devolution of property at death: that is, an interest in fostering
an orderly transfer of material resources from one generation
to the next. While a state could constitutionally abolish the
right of testation and require that all estates devolve pursuant
to the state’s intestacy statute,192 all states do in fact permit
property owners to direct the devolution of their estates upon
death.193 But in the absence of specific testamentary directions
from a decedent, the state’s intestacy statute prescribes the
manner in which the decedent’s property is to be distributed.
This statutory distribution scheme is designed to approximate
the distribution that decedents would have adopted had they
made a will;194 indeed, the seventeenth century jurist Hugo
Grotius believed that the very legitimacy of the rules of
intestate succession depended on their correspondence with the
presumed intentions of decedents.195 Thus, if a decedent
expresses a desire to have her estate distributed to persons
other than—or in shares different from—those set forth in the
intestacy statute, she is expressing desires different from those
the state presumes her to have. Consequently, a state acts
rationally when it demands that the decedent express those
unpredicted individuated wishes in a manner and under
190

Id. at 484-85.
Id. at 486-87 (citing Lindsley, 220 U.S. at 61). The Court’s language here
was quite similar to the language it would use five years later in Weinberger v. Salfi,
422 U.S. 749, 785 (1975), when it held that overbreadth had no bearing on a due
process challenge to a piece of social/economic regulation. See supra text accompanying
notes 168-170.
192
See supra note 183.
193
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS, Introduction (2003).
194
See King v. Riffee, 309 S.E.2d 85, 87-88 (W. Va. 1983); see also John T.
Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 497, 501 (1977).
195
See Stanley N. Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance in the
American Revolutionary Era, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4 (1977).
191
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circumstances suggesting particular thoughtfulness and
voluntariness.196 Inasmuch as American intestacy statutes
without exception prescribe distributions only to natural
persons related to the decedent by blood or marriage,197 a state
likewise acts rationally when it subjects to particular scrutiny
bequests in favor of persons outside those categories: notably,
corporate bodies such as religious or secular charities.
Scholars have identified other state objectives
underlying intestacy statutes: objectives related not to the
presumed intentions of property owners but rather to the
interests of society as a whole. But these societal objectives,
too, suggest that a state may properly subject institutional
bequests to special scrutiny. For example, some scholars have
observed that intestacy statutes serve society’s interests by
“protect[ing] the financially dependent family [and by] . . .
promot[ing] and encourag[ing] the nuclear family.”198 Clearly
the state has an interest in thwarting a testator who intends,
by bequeathing his property to nonfamily members, to
pauperize his dependents and leave to the state the burden of
supporting them. Another societal interest served by intestacy
statutes is the avoidance of disharmony within the particular
family and the avoidance of disdain for the legal system
generally that would be spawned by a distribution scheme that
potential recipients regarded as unwise or unfair.199
It should be self-evident that excessive or impulsive
bequests to charity are especially calculated to engender
feelings of resentment and ill-usage among all the testator’s
family members200 (not merely the particular family members
who receive less than other particular family members), and
196
The formal requirements that states impose by statute on the execution of
wills—e.g., the requirement that the document be signed by the testator and attested
by witnesses in the testator’s presence—are designed in part to reassure courts that
the testator understood the legal consequences of her act and that she was free from
imposition at the time she performed that act. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 5, at 1-10.
And if, despite those formal precautions, the testator executes a will that—because of
fraud, duress, or undue influence by extrinsic parties—does not represent her wishes,
the document will be declared invalid.
197
Most states’ intestacy statutes prescribe identical treatment for siblings of
the half-blood and siblings of the whole-blood. Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws
to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1, 2 n.9 (2000).
198
Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at
Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
319, 324 (1978).
199
LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 2-5 (4th ed.
2006).
200
See supra text accompanying notes 119-121.
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thus a state bent on minimizing such unpleasantness could
quite rationally treat each charitable bequest as a potential
intrafamilial casus belli.201 Moreover, the special indulgences
accorded charitable transfers, including the exemption from
the rule against perpetuities, give the state cause for even
greater concern than in the case of bequests to individuals.202
The key words here are “excessive” and “impulsive.”
How might a state preclude “excessive” charitable bequests
while continuing to allow nonexcessive ones? The state might
authorize probate judges to strike down or reduce those
charitable bequests that they regard as unreasonably large, but
such a free-floating discretionary power would make reliable
tax planning impossible, since attorneys would have no way of
predicting the portion of a client’s estate that would end up
passing to charity, and every will containing a charitable
bequest would be potentially subject to judicial modification.
Furthermore, judges would be asked to make a determination
of “reasonableness” unmoored to any definable standards, and
wildly inconsistent holdings could be expected. On the other
hand, the fixed percentage limits imposed by American
mortmain statutes of the “percentage restriction” type203
represent a more practicable approach to the excessiveness
problem; and the inflexibility of such arithmetic, prophylactic
solutions does not render them constitutionally objectionable.204
How might a state preclude “impulsive” charitable
bequests while continuing to allow thoughtful ones? If the
impulse emanates from another person, the doctrine of “undue
influence” might furnish a solution by invalidating the bequest.
If the impulse is largely self-generated, proof of a lack of
“testamentary capacity” might work. Both doctrines proceed on
201
A number of courts, in deciding whether a doubtful charitable gift is
invalid, have taken into account the family status of those objecting to the gift, leaning
towards overturning the gift when the objectants were close relatives of the transferor
and toward upholding the gift when the objectants were distant relatives. For example,
in Wilber v. Owens, 65 A.2d 843 (N.J. 1949), the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld
the vice-chancellor’s decision to rescue a dubious charitable gift by applying cy pres, id.
at 848, and, in upholding the decision, the Court noted that the testator “had no kin
nearer than first cousins.” Id. at 846; accord Howard Sav. Inst. v. Peep, 170 A.2d 39, 45
(N.J. 1961). See generally Robert J. Lynn, The Questionable Testamentary Gift to
Charity: A Suggested Approach to Judicial Decision, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 450, 463-65
(1963). State legislators displayed a similar instinct when they enacted mortmain
statutes that invalidated charitable bequests only when challenged by particular
relatives. See supra text accompanying notes 137-139.
202
See supra notes 3, 74-76, and 85.
203
See supra text accompanying note 125.
204
See supra text accompanying note 170.
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the notion that, had the testator not been subjected to undue
influence or not been laboring under some sort of mental
aberration, he would not have made the challenged bequest;
and therefore the state acts rationally when it refuses to give
effect to the bequest of a testator whose volition was so
undermined. But actual evidence of undue influence or mental
deficiency is rare. Will contestants generally must rely on
circumstantial evidence to prove their case,205 and the
availability of circumstantial evidence cannot always be
counted upon. If a testator whose prior wills contained no
charitable bequests writes a deathbed will bequeathing
property to a particular secular or religious charity, it seems
not unreasonable to infer that, had he not been facing a
fearfully imminent death, he would have acted differently or
not acted at all.206 Rather than relying upon the difficult and
time-consuming task of sifting through circumstantial evidence
that the testator’s own morbid notions or the pressure of
another person undermined the testator’s mental faculties, a
state acts rationally when it decides upon a prophylactic rule,
however imprecise,207 like a mortmain statute of the deathbed
type.
II.

A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF UNDUE INFLUENCE

Although mortmain statutes can respond effectively—
and constitutionally—to a problem that continues to blight
American families’ lives, the harshness and inflexibility of
those statutes argue against their reenactment. Consequently,
the doctrine of undue influence must continue to serve as the
primary bulwark against the imposition by charitable or
religious organizations upon the mind and free agency of
anxious testators.208
205

See infra text accompanying note 215.
Indeed, scholars, judges, and legislatures have, for centuries, questioned
the propriety of deathbed charitable bequests. See supra notes 1, 17, 18, 59, 101, 118,
and 123 and accompanying text.
207
See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
208
Although mortmain statutes applied only to testamentary transfers, the
doctrine of undue influence applies to both testamentary and inter vivos conveyances.
In determining whether a conveyance resulted from undue influence, courts generally
apply the same standards in the testamentary and inter vivos contexts. MCGOVERN &
KURTZ, supra note 73, § 7.3. Consequently, this portion of the Article will cite, without
distinguishing between them, both challenges to testamentary transfers and challenges
to inter vivos transfers, unless clarity or doctrinal accuracy demands that the
distinction be made. As to differences in the limitations rules applicable to these two
types of challenges, see John B. Jarboe, Undue Influence and Gifts to Religious
206
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If a purported will does not represent the wishes of the
testator who signed it, the instrument is not a valid will, and
the court having jurisdiction over the matter will refuse to
admit the instrument to probate. The charge of undue
influence, as a ground for contesting a will, is a charge that the
will reflects not the wishes of the testator but rather those of a
person who destroyed the testator’s free agency and caused him
to execute a will representing the wishes of that other person.
This displacement or substitution of agency is the vital
underpinning of undue influence, since people persuade people
every day without destroying free agency and without
invalidating wills that reflect such persuasion.209 For influence
to be “undue,” it must amount to more than “the influence
which springs from natural affection or kind offices[; it must
instead spring] from fear, coercion, or any other cause that
deprives the testator of this free agency in the disposition of
property. . . .”210 But however malign or sinister may be the
intentions of a person charged with imposition upon the
testator, her conduct does not constitute undue influence
unless it caused the testator to execute a will that did not
represent his own wishes.211 And conversely (and more
important, for purposes of this Article), the propriety or even
beneficence of an influencer’s motives will not protect a
purported will from a successful contest if that influence in fact
overcame the testator’s free agency.212 The purpose of the
doctrine is not to deprive wrongdoers of their ill-gotten gains213

Organizations, 35 CATH. LAW. 271, 273 (1994). As to differences relating to a certain
evidentiary presumption, see infra text accompanying notes. 278-287.
209
Henderson v. Jackson, 111 N.W. 821, 823 (Iowa 1907).
210
Carpenter v. Horace Mann Life Ins. Co., 730 S.W.2d 502, 507 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1987).
211
1 WILLIAM HERBERT PAGE, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 15.6 (2003).
212
In re Craven’s Will, 86 S.E. 587, 591-92 (N.C. 1915); Anderson v.
Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95, 100 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); see Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d at 505
(stating that moral turpitude on the part of the influencer is not required for undue
influence to be found).
213
Some laws relating to wills do indeed target wrongdoers. The law of almost
every American jurisdiction bars an intestate decedent’s murderer from inheriting any
portion of the victim’s estate, even though the murderer is an heir of the decedent. See
Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 803, 84447 (1993). In some states, a person convicted of the abuse or financial exploitation of an
intestate elderly or disabled person is likewise barred from inheriting from the victim,
even though the wrongdoer is an heir. See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-6.2
(2007). But the law of undue influence does not target wrongdoers as such. If a
decedent’s will is declared invalid on the ground of undue influence, with the result
that the decedent becomes intestate, the person successfully charged with exerting
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but rather to ensure that the testamentary wishes given effect
by the probate court truly are the testator’s wishes: that is, to
ensure that the will is not “the product of a captive mind.”214
Because undue influence is generally exerted in secret,
direct evidence of such influence almost never exists; a finding
of undue influence is usually based entirely on circumstantial
evidence.215 And to that end, black-letter law traditionally
identifies four elements of the circumstantial case: four
elements that need to be proved in order for a will to be
rejected on the ground of undue influence. Despite the
circularity of this four-part “test,” courts and commentators
quote it so often that it is worth quoting again. It must be
shown
(1) that the testator was susceptible to undue influence, (2) that the
influencer had the disposition or motive to exercise undue influence,
(3) that the influencer had the opportunity to exercise undue
influence, and (4) that the disposition is the result of the influence.216

Some of these elements require further elaboration.
Although the first of these four elements presupposes that the
testator’s condition or circumstances rendered him especially
susceptible to influence,217 this element does not require that
the testator have been so far gone as to lack the mental
capacity to make a valid will.218 Indeed, strictly speaking, a
claim of undue influence is logically inconsistent with a claim
of testamentary incapacity inasmuch as undue influence
undue influence may still share in the decedent’s intestate property if he or she is an
heir of the decedent. In re Randall’s Estate, 132 P.2d 763, 766 (Idaho 1942).
214
PAGE, supra note 211, at § 15.3.
215
In re Ferrill’s Will, 640 P.2d 489, 493 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981); see Smith v.
Moore, 176 So. 2d 868, 871 (Ala. 1965); In re Estate of Olsson, 344 S.W.2d 171, 173-74
(Tex. Civ. App. 1961); see also In re The Bible Speaks, 869 F.2d 628, 642 (1st Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989).
216
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 85, at 159; accord Burgess v. Bohle (In re
Hull’s Estate), 146 P.2d 242, 245 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944); In re Estate of Herbert, 979 P.2d
39, 53 (Haw. 1999); In re Estate of Opsahl, 448 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989);
Estate of Kamesar, 259 N.W.2d 733, 737-39 (Wis. 1977).
217
See, e.g., Gardiner v. Goertner, 149 So. 186, 189 (Fla. 1932); Wallace v.
Scott, 844 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992); In re Cotcher’s Estate, 264 N.W. 325,
327 (Mich. 1936).
218
In re Estate of Miller, 778 N.E.2d 262, 267 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). To lack the
mental capacity to write a valid will, a testator must be very “far gone” indeed; a
person who lacks sufficient mental capacity to write an enforceable contract or to
manage his own property may still have sufficient mental capacity to execute a valid
will. Gibony v. Foster, 130 S.W. 314, 323 (Mo. 1910); see Bye v. Mattingly, 975 S.W.2d
451, 456 (Ky. 1998) (“Merely . . . possessing a failing memory, momentary
forgetfulness, weakness of mental powers or lack of strict coherence in conversation
does not render one incapable of validly executing a will.”).
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postulates that a decedent’s testamentary intent was overcome
by another person while testamentary incapacity postulates
that the decedent was incapable of forming any testamentary
intent in the first place.219 In point of fact, however, many
contestants who challenge a will on undue influence grounds do
also raise separate objections based on lack of testamentary
capacity,220 for the two doctrines are more closely related than
strict logic would indicate: a relation that implicates the fourth
element of undue influence.
The fourth element of undue influence—often reworded
coveted result by Wisconsin courts221—requires that the
provisions of the will appear on their face to reflect the desires
of the alleged influencer rather than reflecting what one would
suppose to be the “natural” desires of the testator: that is, that
the will fail to provide for the natural objects of the testator’s
bounty. Thus, a substantial bequest to a mere casual
acquaintance suggests undue influence when the testator’s
father was still living at the time she executed her will,222 as
does a substantial bequest to a housekeeper to the exclusion of
several nieces and nephews who had been named in prior
wills.223 “Unnatural” provisions are hardly conclusive proof of
undue influence—indeed, a testator is theoretically permitted
to be as arbitrary and unfair in her will as she wishes without
thereby forfeiting the right to have her testamentary directions
honored224—but they do raise suspicions of such influence. And
219

In re Estate of Aageson, 702 P.2d 338, 342 (Mont. 1985).
See, e.g., First Sec. Bank & Trust Co. v. Christianson (In re Estate of
Dankbar), 430 N.W.2d 124, 127 (Iowa 1988); Hodges v. Hodges, 692 S.W.2d 361, 365
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985); McKee v. Stoddard, 780 P.2d 736, 740 (Or. Ct. App. 1989); Gold’s
Estate, 182 A.2d 707, 709 (Pa. 1962); In re Estate of Burt, 169 A.2d 32, 34-35 (Vt.
1961).
221
See, e.g., Lee ex rel. Estate of Kamesar v. Kamesar (In re Estate of
Kamesar), 259 N.W.2d 733, 737 (Wis. 1977).
222
See In re Estate of Dankbar, 430 N.W.2d at 131.
223
See In re Will of Ridge, 275 S.E.2d 424 (N.C. 1981). In most successful will
contests based on undue influence, the influencer is named as a beneficiary. That is,
the result “coveted” by the influencer was financial benefit for himself. But occasionally
an influencer might pressure a testator to benefit someone else, and such pressure can
still constitute undue influence even though the influencer was not himself a
beneficiary. Bedree v. Bedree, 528 N.E.2d 1128, 1129 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (the
influencer was the grantor’s husband; the grantees were his sisters); Needels v.
Roberts, 879 S.W.2d 550, 551 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (the influencer was the testator’s
wife; the beneficiary was the wife’s son by a prior marriage); Suagee v. Cook (In re
Estate of Maheras), 897 P.2d 268, 274 (Okla. 1995) (the influencer was a pastor; the
beneficiary was the pastor’s church).
224
See, e.g., Joseph v. Grisham 482 S.E.2d 251, 252 (Ga. 1997) (upholding a
will even though the testator disinherited her children in favor of her grandchildren);
Nelson v. O’Connor, 473 P.2d 161, 162-63 (Or. 1970) (upholding a will even though the
220
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not only do unnatural bequests support an inference of undue
influence, they may also support an inference of testamentary
incapacity. A testator, to be judged mentally competent, must
know and understand who the natural objects of her bounty
are.225 Consequently, a will that “unnaturally” prefers strangers
in blood to significant family members may suggest not only
the pernicious influence of an outsider (undue influence) but
also a failure on the testator’s part to know the identities of the
natural objects of her bounty (testamentary incapacity).
Because a testator possessed of a normal strength of will is
unlikely to yield to undue influence, Lawrence Frolik has
suggested that a finding of undue influence presupposes an
intermediate level of mental deficiency, neither fully capable
nor fully incapable.226 He calls it “marginal testamentary
capacity,” between that of the fully incapacitated testator, who
is barred from executing any will at all, and that of the
“normal” testator, who is permitted to execute any will at all,
including an “unnatural” one.227
For influence to be “undue” in the context of a will
contest, the influence must have operated at the time the
testator executed his will. The influencer’s actual conduct need
not have coincided with the execution; what is required is only
that the constraining effect of that conduct have been felt by
the testator at the very time he executed his will.228 In Trust
testator disinherited her only child in favor of her neighbor); see also Clapp v.
Fullerton, 34 N.Y. 190, 197 (1866) (“The right of a testator to dispose of his estate,
depends neither on the justice of his prejudices nor the soundness of his reasoning. He
may do what he will with his own; and if there be no defect of testamentary capacity,
and no undue influence or fraud, the law gives effect to his will, though its provisions
are unreasonable and unjust.”).
225
Wrigley v. Wrigley (In re Estate of Wrigley), 433 N.E.2d 995, 1003 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1982); Bye v. Mattingly, 975 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Ky. 1998); Estate of Record, 534 A.2d
1319, 1321 (Me. 1987); In re Will of Wasson, 562 So. 2d 74, 77 (Miss. 1990).
226
Lawrence A. Frolik, The Strange Interplay of Testamentary Capacity and
the Doctrine of Undue Influence: Are We Protecting Older Testators or Overriding
Individual Preferences?, 24 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 253, 264-66 (2001).
227
Id.
228
Tobin v. Jenkins, 29 Ark. 151, 157 (1874); Trust Co. of Ga. v. Ivey, 173 S.E.
648, 654 (Ga. 1934); Tawney v. Long, 76 Pa. 106, 115 (1874).
In 1983, the Idaho legislature, concerned that for-profit nursing homes
might exert undue influence on residents to induce them to bequeath property to the
homes, enacted a statute making such bequests void in certain circumstances. 1983
Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 236, § 1, at 642. Originally, the statute applied only if the
testator resided at the legatee-home at the time the will containing such a bequest was
executed. In 1994, when the statute was amended to create a mere presumption of
undue influence rather than an absolute bar to such bequests, the legislature removed
the requirement that the testator had to be in residence when the will was executed
(though the testator still had to have resided in the legatee-home within one year of his
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Co. of Georgia v. Ivey, for instance, a will was successfully
challenged on the basis of the undue influence of a person who
had already died by the time the testator executed the
contested instruments.229 The testator’s wife, Dosia, had written
a will leaving the entire residue of her estate for the founding
of a residence for elderly “gentlewomen.”230 Evidence was
introduced showing that when Doria learned that the will
executed by her husband made no provision for Dosia’s pet
project, Dosia harassed him with constant appeals and threats
and warned him that he would never again live peaceably with
her unless he changed his will to suit her wishes.231 And the
testator, a man in a weakened and diseased condition, was
thereby induced to change his will so as to bequeath
substantial assets to Dosia’s residence.232 Dosia predeceased the
testator, yet even after her death, the testator executed two
codicils increasing the share of his estate that would pass to
Doria’s residence.233 After rejecting on undue influence grounds
the last will that the testator had executed while Dosia was
still live, the court also rejected these last two codicils on the
ground of Dosia’s posthumous undue influence over her
husband.234 “[T]he influence and domination of [Dosia] over [the
testator] . . . [was] so complete and deep rooted that they
persisted even after the death of [Dosia], and continued to
dominate and control his will and to substitute her will
therefore [sic], in the disposition of his estate . . . .”235
Dosia’s conduct as reported in the Ivey case illustrates
one kind of conduct that can constitute undue influence. What
other kinds of conduct might amount to undue influence? If
they succeed in overcoming a testator’s free agency, threats of
violence can certainly constitute undue influence,236 though
they might be more properly characterized as duress inasmuch

death for the statute to apply). 1994 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 350, § 1, p. 1110. The statute
is now codified at IDAHO CODE § 15-2-616 (2007). By removing the requirement of
contemporaneous residence, the legislature implicitly acknowledged that the effect of
undue influence can continue to be felt by its target even after the influential conduct
has ceased.
229
Trust Co. of Georgia v. Ivey, 173 S.E. 648, 655 (Ga. 1934).
230
Id. at 649.
231
Id. at 651.
232
Id.
233
Id. at 652-53.
234
Id. at 655.
235
Id. at 652.
236
See, e.g., Gay v. Gillilan, 5 S.W. 7, 10 (Mo. 1887).
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as such threats are criminal violations of the law.237 But threats
to do perfectly legal acts—threats to divorce the testator,238
threats to bring a criminal prosecution against the testator,239
threats to abandon a sick or imperiled testator,240 threats to put
the testator in a nursing home241—can likewise constitute
undue influence.242 A pattern of harassing requests for money
can constitute undue influence.243 Playing upon the testator’s
religious beliefs or beliefs in spiritualism can likewise
constitute undue influence.244 So too can a pattern of behavior
calculated to isolate the testator from the natural objects of her
bounty, either isolating her emotionally by making false
statements about those objects or isolating her physically.245
The fact that the influential statements made to the
testator were true, or that the influencer believed them to be
true, will not prevent a proper finding of undue influence.246
Undue influence is not fraud. One can find the occasional old
case that describes undue influence as a “species of fraud,”247
but such usage is mere shorthand. Indeed, one of these old
237

See MCGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 73, at 305.
Needels v. Roberts, 879 S.W.2d 550, 551 (Mo. App. 1994).
239
In re Brunor, 47 N.Y.S. 681, 684-85 (App. Div. 1897).
240
Pohlmann v. Naschel (In re Pohlmann’s Estate), 201 P.2d 446, 452 (Cal.
App. 1949); In re Sickles’s Will, 50 A. 577, 579 (Prerog. Ct. N.J. 1901), aff’d, 53 A. 1125
(Ct. Err. & App. N.J. 1902).
241
In re Panek, 667 N.Y.S.2d 177, 179-80 (App. Div. 1997).
242
One should keep in mind, of course, that if these threats do not in fact
deprive the testator of his free agency, the threats do not constitute undue influence.
See, e.g., Kirby v. Manies, 351 S.W.2d 429, 430 (Ark. 1961) (finding that a threat by the
testator’s step-grandson to abandon her if she failed to make a will in his favor did not
constitute undue influence inasmuch as the testator was not in any way helpless or
dependent).
243
Erb v. Lee, 430 N.E.2d 869, 872 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982).
244
In re Bishop’s Estate, 39 P.2d 201, 201-02 (Cal. 1934); Orchardson v.
Cofield, 49 N.E. 197, 202 (Ill. 1897); see also Ingersoll v. Gourley, 139 P. 207 (Wash.
1914). In this last case, the trial court had held the will invalid on the grounds of both
testamentary incapacity and undue influence. Id. at 207. The state supreme court
affirmed the trial court’s finding of testamentary incapacity but did not address the
issue of undue influence. Id. at 209.
245
In re Stoddart’s Estate, 163 P. 1010, 1011-13 (Cal. 1917) (finding that
allegations that influencers told the testator that her married daughters had married
extravagant husbands who were likely to dissipate any inheritance were sufficient to
state an undue influence claim); Cox v. Wall, 179 N.E.2d 815, 816-17 (Mass. 1962)
(physical isolation); McPeak v. McPeak, 593 N.W.2d 180, 185 (Mich. App. 1999)
(finding that a lengthy “pattern of conduct directed at isolating” the decedent sustained
a finding of undue influence).
246
Roberts-Douglas v. Meares, 624 A.2d 405, 420 (D.C. Ct. of App. 1992),
modified on other grounds and reaff’d, 624 A.2d 431 (D.C. 1993); see also Gockel v.
Gockel, 66 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Mo. 1933); Corrigan v. Pironi, 23 A. 355, 355 (N.J. 1891).
247
See, e.g., Coghill v. Kennedy, 24 So. 459, 468 (Ala. 1898); Flanigan v.
Smith, 169 N.E. 767, 769 (Ill. 1929).
238
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cases that use the inaccurate “species of fraud” phrase goes on
immediately to state the law correctly:
Deceit is the use of any trick, false statement, secret device, or false
pretense to defraud another; and it is clear that undue influence may
be exercised without the use of any of these means,—for example,
through the imposition of fear, or constant importunity, to which the
testator yields from a desire for peace. It was not necessary to aver
that fraud or deceit was practiced upon the testatrix [to justify an
inference of undue influence].248

Doctrinally, the distinction between fraud and undue
influence is clear. In a case of undue influence, the testator’s
free agency has been destroyed, and the will does not represent
her wishes. In a case of fraud, the testator’s free agency is
unimpaired and the will does indeed represent her wishes, but
she formulated her wishes on the basis of false information
deceitfully proffered.
In a will contest brought on the ground of undue
influence, the contestant bears the burden of persuasion.249 In
some jurisdictions, this burden must be met by clear and
convincing evidence;250 other jurisdictions require only a
preponderance of the evidence.251 Because a contestant usually
has available to him only circumstantial evidence with which
to meet this burden,252 courts have attempted to ease the
contestant’s difficulties by developing a two-part test that can
enable him to raise a presumption of undue influence:
A presumption of undue influence arises if [1] the alleged
[influencer253] was in a confidential relationship with the [testator]
and [2] there were suspicious circumstances surrounding the
preparation, formulation, or execution of the [will] . . . .254

248

Coghill, 24 So. at 468.
See, e.g., Williams v. Thornton, 145 So. 2d 828, 829 (Ala. 1962); In re
Estate of Herbert, 979 P.2d 39, 54 (Haw. 1999); In re Estate of Kline, 613 N.E.2d 1329,
1336-37 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Martin v. O’Connor, 406 S.W.2d 41, 43 (Mo. 1966).
250
See, e.g., Russo v. Miller, 559 A.2d 354, 357 (Me. 1989); Anthony v.
Evangelical Lutheran Church (In re Anthony), 121 N.W.2d 772, 776-77 (Minn. 1963).
251
See, e.g., In re Estate of Herbert, 979 P.2d 39, 54 (Haw. 1999); In re Estate
of Duebendorfer, 721 N.W.2d 438, 447 (S.D. 2006).
252
See supra text accompanying note 215.
253
The Restatement uses the word “wrongdoer,” not “influencer.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 (2001).
I believe “wrongdoer” to be an ill-advised term in this context inasmuch as the
influencer’s conduct need not be wrongful to be undue. See supra note 212.
254
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.3 cmt. f (2001) (emphasis added); see In re Ferrill’s Will, 640 P.2d 489, 493 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1981); Knutsen v. Krippendorf, 862 P.2d 509, 515 (Or. Ct. App. 1993). It should be
249
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A confidential relationship is a relationship of
inequality: a relationship in which the testator reposes an
exceptional degree of reliance on the integrity and loyalty of
another, either because of that other person’s knowledge or
status or because of the testator’s dependence or subservience.
Some relationships—known in law as fiduciary relationships—
are confidential relationships as a matter of law. For example,
the law imposes fiduciary duties on an attorney vis-à-vis her
client; therefore, for purposes of this presumption of undue
influence, the testator’s attorney is in a confidential
relationship with the testator.255 Similarly, the relationship
between the trustee of a trust and the beneficiary of that trust
is a confidential relationship,256 as is the relationship between a
court-appointed guardian and her ward.257
Outside the narrow confines of fiduciary relationships,
the existence or nonexistence of a confidential relationship
between influencer and testator has been treated as a question
of fact.258 Such nonfiduciary confidential relationships generally
fall into one of two categories, reliant relationships and
dominant-subservient relationships,259 although the categories
often overlap. The first category comprises relationships based
noted that the contestant need not establish the existence of a confidential relationship
to win her case. That is, undue influence can be found even though no confidential
relationship existed between the alleged influencer and the testator. Blits v. Blits, 468
So. 2d 320, 321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). A finding of a confidential relationship is a
requirement only of raising this presumption of undue influence. But this presumption
has considerable practical importance, and many a will has been set aside on undue
influence grounds where a confidential relationship existed that would not have been
set aside in the absence of a confidential relationship. See Roberts-Douglas v. Meares,
624 A.2d 405, 421 (D.C. 1992), modified on other grounds and reaff’d, 624 A.2d 431
(D.C. 1993).
255
See, e.g., Allen v. Estate of Dutton, 394 So. 2d 132, 134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980); In re Estate of Novak, 458 N.W.2d 221, 224, 227 (Neb. 1990); Haynes v. First
Nat’l State Bank of New Jersey, 432 A.2d 890, 897 (N.J. 1981); In re Putnam’s Will,
177 N.E. 399, 400 (N.Y. 1931).
256
See, e.g., In re Estate of Cass, 719 A.2d 595, 598 (N.H. 1998).
257
Pepin v. Ryan, 47 A.2d 846, 847 (Conn. 1946); Birch v. Coleman, 691
S.W.2d 875, 878 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985); Consul Gen. of Yugoslavia v. Thomas (In re
Basich’s Estate), 398 N.E.2d 1182, 1186 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979); Estate of Bodman v.
Bodman, 674 So. 2d 1245, 1246 (Miss. 1996).
258
See In re Estate of Olsson, 344 S.W.2d 171, 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (“If a
rule of general application exists at all with respect to undue influence cases, it is that
each case must stand on its own bottom as to the legal sufficiency of the facts proven.”
(emphasis omitted)).
Later in this Article, I shall recommend treating certain nonfiduciary
relationships between pastor and communicant as confidential as a matter of law. See
infra text accompanying notes 339-342.
259
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.3 cmt. g (2003).
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on special trust and confidence, where, for example, the
testator “was accustomed to be guided by the judgment or
advice of the alleged [influencer] or was justified in placing
confidence in the belief that the alleged [influencer] would act
in the interest of the [testator],” as in the case of the testator
and his financial advisor.260 The second category comprises
relationships in which the testator “was subservient to the
alleged [influencer’s] dominant influence,” such as might exist
between an enfeebled testator and his hired caregiver.261
A good example of a reliant confidential relationship is
to be found in In re Estate of Borsch.262 The testator and the
alleged influencer, one Alan Herbert, had been friends for
twenty-five years and saw each other on a daily basis and often
ate meals together.263 Herbert and Herbert’s wife frequently did
odd jobs for the testator, “such as mowing his lawn and driving
him to town.”264 The testator consulted the Herberts (especially
Alan Herbert) “on all his business and personal matters” and
“on just about anything that came along.”265 Alan Herbert
helped the testator prepare an inventory of his assets that the
testator’s attorney had requested, and he also prepared at the
testator’s request lists of the testator’s mining claims.266 Indeed,
the testator “frequently asked [Herbert] to do things like that
for him, to write letters, make notes, whatever he happened to
have that needed writing.”267 Based on all these facts, the court
concluded that a confidential relationship existed between Alan
Herbert and the testator.268
An example of a dominant-subservient confidential
relationship is to be found in Gentry v. Rigsby.269 The alleged
influencer was Dorothy Rigsby: the testator’s friend and,
evidently, paid caregiver. Evidence showed that she “pressured
[the testator] into going to places and participating in activities
260

Id.
Id.
262
353 N.W.2d 346 (S.D. 1984).
263
Id. at 348. Evidence showed that the testator feared missing some of these
dining engagements lest Herbert and his wife “get mad at me.” Id. at 350. Such
evidence suggests that this confidential relationship was not exclusively of the reliant
type but also had elements of the dominant-subservient type.
264
Id. at 350.
265
Id. at 348.
266
Id. at 349.
267
Id.
268
Id. at 351.
269
No. 01A01-9610-CV-00455, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 419 (Ct. App. June 11,
1997).
261
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in which he had no desire.”270 At one point, she advised the
testator against taking some medication prescribed by his
doctor, and he followed Rigsby’s advice.271 The testator “was an
emotional man who frequently cried,” and “[m]ore than one
witness testified that [the testator] did whatever Rigsby
said.”272 And on at least four occasions during the last eleven
months of the testator’s death, Rigsby drove him to local banks
where the testator added Rigsby’s name as joint owner for a
number of accounts and certificates of deposit.273 With all of
these facts before it, the court held that a confidential
relationship existed between the testator and Rigsby.274
But in order to raise a presumption of undue influence,
a will contestant must do more than prove the existence of a
confidential relationship. She must also prove the existence of
what the Restatement of Property calls “suspicious
circumstances.”275 In the Borsch case, for example, evidence
showed that Alan Herbert advised the testator that his earlier
will (which benefited the testator’s family) “won’t stand up for
thirty seconds” and participated quite actively in the
preparation of the testator’s last will, which left virtually the
entire estate to Herbert and Herbert’s wife.276 The comments
accompanying the Restatement of Property offer a nonexclusive
list of eight factors that may be considered suspicious
circumstances for purposes of raising this presumption of
undue influence where a confidential relationship exists:
(1) the extent to which the [testator] was in a weakened condition,
physically, mentally, or both, and therefore susceptible to undue
influence;
(2) the extent to which the alleged [influencer] participated in the
preparation or procurement of the will . . .;
(3) whether the [testator] received independent advice from an
attorney . . . in preparing the will . . .;
(4) whether the will . . . was prepared in secrecy or in haste;

270

Gentry, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 419 at *9.
Id.
272
Id. at *15-16.
273
Id.
274
Id.
275
See infra note 259 and accompanying text; see also Hurd v. Brown (In re
Baird’s Estate), 168 P. 561, 563 (Cal. 1917); Barton v. Beck’s Estate, 195 A.2d 63, 67
(Me. 1963); In re Estate of Borsch, 353 N.W.2d 346, 348 (S.D. 1984).
276
In re Estate of Borsch, 353 N.W.2d at 347, 350-51.
271
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(5) whether the [testator’s] attitude toward others had changed by
reason of his or her relationship with the alleged [influencer];
(6) whether there is a decided discrepancy between a new and
previous wills . . . of the [testator];
(7) whether there was a continuity of purpose running through
former wills . . . indicating a settled intent in the disposition of his or
her property[: a continuity that the challenged will evidently did not
reflect]; and
(8) whether the disposition of the property is such that a reasonable
person would regard it as unnatural, unjust, or unfair, for example,
whether the disposition abruptly and without apparent reason
disinherited a faithful and deserving family member.277

One should note that the Restatement’s list does not
include a mere bequest in favor of a person with whom the
testator had a confidential relationship. Indeed, treating every
such bequest as a suspicious circumstance would threaten the
validity of a wide variety of small or routine bequests to
persons who happened to be the testator’s caregiver or
physician or guardian. Oddly enough, courts have, in the inter
vivos context, treated a gift in any amount or situation as a
suspicious circumstance.278 But in the testamentary context
they seem to agree with the Restatement’s implication that a
mere bequest to the confidential party is not considered
suspicious.279 For a bequest to be suspicious, it must suggest
overreaching: for example, a bequest to the confidential party
amounting to a substantial portion of the estate,280 or a bequest
to the confidential party that disadvantages the natural objects
of the testator’s bounty.281
If a will contestant raises a presumption of undue
influence, the burden then shifts to the proponent, but courts
disagree as to the nature of the burden that is shifted. Some
277
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.3 cmt. h (2003). See Estate of Hamilton v. Morris, 67 S.W.3d 786, 793 (Tenn. App.
2001).
278
See, e.g., Upman v. Clarke, 753 A.2d 4, 5 (Md. 2000); DesMarais v.
Desjardins, 664 A.2d 840, 844 (Me. 1995); Summit Bank v. Quake, 631 N.E.2d 13, 15
(Ind. Ct. App. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Mitchell v. Mitchell, 695 N.E.2d
920 (Ind. 1998).
279
See, e.g., Haynes v. First Nat’l State Bank of New Jersey, 432 A.2d 890,
897 (N.J. 1981) (citing In re Rittenhouse’s Will, 117 A.2d 401, 402 (N.J. 1955))
(suggesting that “additional circumstances of a suspicious character” are required to
raise the presumption of undue influence even where “the will benefits one who stood
in a confidential relationship to the testat[or]”).
280
See, e.g., Enders v. Parker ex rel. Estate of Kottke (In re Estate of Kottke),
6 P.3d 243, 244, 247-48 (Alaska 2000).
281
See, e.g., Pepin v. Ryan, 47 A.2d 846, 847 (Conn. 1946).

628

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:2

courts hold that the ultimate burden of persuasion shifts to the
proponent;282 but the better view is that the contestant’s raising
of the presumption shifts to the proponent only the burden of
going forward with contrary evidence (that is, the burden of
production).283 If the proponent has no contrary evidence, the
contestant is, of course, entitled to a directed verdict.284 But if
the proponent does produce contrary evidence, the presumption
of undue influence dwindles to a mere inference of undue
influence: an inference that the trier of fact may accept or
reject after considering all the evidence produced by both sides
(including the evidence the contestant used to raise the
presumption) but leaving the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion
with the contestant.285
The proponent’s response to the contestant’s showing of
undue influence can take different forms. For example, the
proponent might present evidence contradicting the elements
of the contestant’s case, such as the contestant’s claim that a
confidential relationship existed between the influencer and
the testator or the claim that the testator was peculiarly
susceptible to undue influence.286 Or the proponent might
present evidence going directly to the contestant’s underlying
claim by showing that the will did indeed represent the
testator’s own wishes, such as evidence that the testator had
independent reasons for adopting a seemingly “unnatural” plan
of disposition287 or evidence that the testator received truly
independent legal advice from an attorney.288

282

See, e.g., Bernard v. Foley, 139 P.3d 1196, 1199 (Cal. 2006); In re Last Will
and Testament of Melson, 711 A.2d 783, 784 (Del. 1998).
283
See e.g., Carpenter v. Carpenter (In re Estate of Carpenter), 253 So. 2d 697,
704 (Fla. 1971); Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp. v. Dean, 448 N.E.2d 872, 876 (Ill.
1983); Guill v. Wolpert, 218 N.W.2d 224, 235 (Neb. 1974); Martin v. Phillips, 369
S.E.2d 397, 401 (Va. 1988).
284
In re Estate of Henke, 561 N.E.2d 314, 317 (Ill. App. 1990).
285
Id.; see also Gillett v. Michigan United Traction Co., 171 N.W. 536, 538
(Mich. 1919) (“It is now quite generally held by the courts that a rebuttable . . .
presumption has no weight as evidence. It serves to establish a prima facie case; but, if
challenged by rebutting evidence, the presumption cannot be weighed against the
evidence. Supporting evidence must be introduced [by the party who previously
invoked the presumption], and it then becomes a question of weighing the actual
evidence introduced, without giving any evidential force to the presumption itself.”).
286
PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO WILLS, TRUSTS AND ADMINISTRATION 47 (2d
ed. 1994).
287
See, e.g., In re Estate of Weickum, 317 N.W.2d 142, 146 (S.D. 1982).
288
Enders v. Parker ex rel. Estate of Kottke (In re Estate of Kottke), 6 P.3d
243, 248 (Alaska 2000); In re Estate of Wright, 199 N.E.2d 54, 59 (Ill. App. 1964).
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ERRONEOUS APPLICATION OF THESE STANDARDS IN
CASES OF RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE

American law should be no less concerned today about
the “imposition upon pious . . . minds”289 than it was when
mortmain statutes were still on the books. As recently as 2006,
the North American Securities Association reported an
increase in the fraudulent bilking of the faithful by religious
organizations. “The scammers are getting smarter, and the
investors don’t ask enough questions because of the feeling that
they can be safe in church.”290 And one can hardly forget the
appalling illustration of religious conversion’s power provided
by the events in 1979 when “hundreds of members of the
People’s Temple, after having given up homes and country to
move to the jungles of Guyana, obeyed their leader Jim Jones’s
commands to commit suicide and even to murder their children
and reluctant comrades.”291 In the more placid world of
testamentary transfers, modern courts have often prevented
religion-based imposition upon testators by correctly applying
the conventional rules of undue influence law.292 Of course, by
correctly applying those rules, courts have sometimes found
there to be no undue influence.293 But where courts have
reasoned erroneously in religious undue influence cases, their
error generally consists in holding either (1) that a testator
cannot be unduly influenced by a clergyman’s remarks
addressed to a whole congregation rather than to her alone; or
(2) that a finding of undue influence in religion-based cases
violates the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of
religion.
In the discussion that follows, I wish to disclaim any
intention to treat a testator’s religious belief—however
289

Note I, Phila. Baptist Ass’n, supra note 101, at 22-23.
Swindlers Fleecing Faithful of Billions, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 14, 2006, at sec. 2,
p. 3 (emphasis added) (quoting the president of the securities association).
291
C. DANIEL BATSON ET AL., RELIGION AND THE INDIVIDUAL: A SOCIALPSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 32 (1993).
292
See, e.g., Estate of Hee v. Toth (In re Estate of Hee), 252 So. 2d 846, 847
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Bryan v. Norton, 265 S.E.2d 282, 283-84 (Ga. 1980); Suagee
v. Cook (In re Estate of Maheras), 897 P.2d 268, 270 (Okla. 1995); Nelson v. Dodge, 68
A.2d 51, 57-58 (R.I. 1949) (invalidating inter vivos transfers). The cited opinion in
Bryan merely reversed a directed verdict in favor of the proponent and remanded the
case with instructions to submit the issue of undue influence to the jury. 265 S.E.2d at
284. That the contest was successful on remand was reported in a subsequent case
involving attorney fees. See Bryan v. Granade, 357 S.E.2d 92, 93 (Ga. 1987).
293
See, e.g., Doyle v. Clancy (In re McIntyre’s Estate), 159 N.W. 517, 524
(Mich. 1916); Caughey v. Bridenbagh, 57 A. 821, 828-29 (Pa. 1904).
290
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unconventional it may be or however rigidly it may be held—as
a form of delusion suggestive of mental incapacity. While some
courts maintain that religious belief never can be considered
evidence of incapacity,294 others take a less absolute view and
hold that “a man may, through manifestations of religious
belief, evidence mental disorder.”295 By confining the discussion
to undue influence, however, we can avoid inquiries into the
reasonableness of particular religious beliefs inasmuch as
statements can constitute undue influence even if they are
true.296 Thus, if clergyman Smith says to the testator, “The Lord
wants you to leave all your money to my church,” such conduct
should constitute undue influence if it overcomes the testator’s
free agency and causes her to execute a church-favoring will
that she would not otherwise have executed, even if Smith is
factually correct about the Lord’s wishes.297 Undue influence
does not mean fraud.298 Nor does it mean malevolence; Smith’s
conduct can still constitute undue influence even if it is
motivated only by concern for the salvation of the testator’s
soul since beneficence of motive does not rule out undue
influence.299
A.

The Unwarranted Requirement of Personal Contact

In In re Cotcher’s Estate,300 the testator had bequeathed
one-third of her residuary estate to a Catholic orphanage and
two-thirds to the pastor of her local Catholic cathedral for the
benefit of a local parochial school. This will was prepared for

294

See, e.g., Minturn v. Conception Abbey, 61 S.W.2d 352, 359 (Mo. Ct. App.

1933).
295
See, e.g., Ingersoll v. Gourley, 139 P. 207, 209 (Wash. 1914); Henderson v.
Jackson, 111 N.W. 821, 822-23 (Iowa 1907). The Henderson court wrote:

It is true that if there be other circumstances fairly tending to show
unsoundness of mind, . . . all these peculiarities of life and conduct, religious
or otherwise, will properly be a matter of inquiry, and may in some instances
furnish legitimate support to a verdict or judgment against the validity of a
will. But standing alone, we think no case can be found in which it has been
held that such peculiarities of the testator are sufficient to impeach his
testamentary capacity . . . .
Id. at 823.
296

See supra text accompanying note 246.
Cf. supra text accompanying note 97, to the effect that the value of religion
does not depend on the objective truth of its tenets.
298
See supra text accompanying notes 247-248.
299
See supra text accompanying note 212.
300
In re Cotcher’s Estate, 264 N.W. 325, 325-26 (Mich. 1936).
297
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her by the attorney for the local Roman Catholic bishop.301 The
will was contested on the ground of undue influence.302 While
the court conceded that the Roman Catholic priest charged
with exerting the influence had visited her in her home and
had, from the pulpit, advised his parishioners that for the
benefit of their own souls and those of their predecessors it
would be wise to make financial donations to the Church or its
institutions,303 the court rejected the contestants’ claim of
undue influence on the ground that the priest’s solicitations
“were made to all parishioners alike” rather than to the
testator as an individual.304
The Cotcher court’s distinction overlooks the extraordinary power that pastoral exhortations can exert upon the
members of a congregation to whom the exhortations are
addressed.305 The Internal Revenue Service certainly recognizes
that power when it challenges the income tax exemption of a
church whose minister, from the pulpit, exhorts his
parishioners to vote for (or against) a particular political
candidate.306 If a testator’s pricks of conscience stemming from
301
Id. at 326. The testator had executed two previous wills. Id. Curiously,
while the court implies that these earlier wills were drafted by someone other than the
bishop’s attorney, the court does not indicate whether the religious bequests made in
the last will were included in the prior wills. Id. I describe the court’s omission as
curious because any substantial increase in religious bequests reflected in that third
will might be a “suspicious circumstance” not inconsistent with a charge of undue
influence. See supra text accompanying note 277 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 cmt. h (2003)).
302
In re Cotcher’s Estate, 264 N.W. at 325.
303
Id. at 326.
304
Id. at 327; accord Roberts-Douglas v. Meares, 624 A.2d 405, 421 (D.C.
1992), modified on other grounds and reaff’d, 624 A.2d 431 (D.C. 1993) (“If the only
connection between donor and donee is that the former sits in a church pew, listens to
the latter’s sermon, and conscientiously makes a contribution, the occasion for special
scrutiny does not arise.”). The court did acknowledge, however, that exhortations from
the pulpit might weaken an individual’s resolve so as to make him more susceptible to
one-on-one influence than he otherwise would have been. Id. at 424.
305
In Roberts-Douglas, the court stated that “[s]ermons by [a bishop] to his
entire flock . . . are not the stuff from which a confidential relationship is derived.” 624
A.2d at 422.
306
The income received by a not-for-profit religious organization can be
exempt from federal income tax pursuant to section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code, but the organization must forfeit its 501(c)(3) exemption if it “participate[s] in, or
intervene[s] in . . . any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any
candidate for public office.” I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986). Thus, in Christian Echoes
National Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), it was held that
the Internal Revenue Service acted properly in revoking the taxpayer’s § 501(c)(3) taxexemption, where the taxpayer had “used its publications and broadcasts to attack
candidates and incumbents who were considered too liberal. It attacked President
Kennedy in 1961 and urged its followers to elect conservatives like Senator Strom
Thurmond . . . .” Id. at 856.
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the pleas of a person now dead can support a finding of undue
influence,307 it seems no stretch to conclude that pricks of
conscience stemming from a clergyman’s exhortations to his
congregation can support such a finding. I am not suggesting
that statements from a pulpit necessarily constitute undue
influence, but merely that they are capable of doing so and
should not be excluded as the Cotcher case excluded them.308
Clergymen are certainly aware of the powerful influence
they can wield from the pulpit. When it seemed likely that
Congress would amend the federal hate crimes statute to add
sexual orientation to the list of hatreds warranting enhanced
penalties if they motivated violent crimes, a number of
clergymen expressed the fear that their anti-gay sermons
might subject them to hate crime prosecutions if their sermons
spurred congregants to violent action. One pastor stated, “I
don’t believe the Bible condones gay lifestyles. Yet the way
these laws would be invoked would be that whoever is a
commander or director of this kind of action can be brought up
on the same charges as the actual perpetrator of a crime.”309
The court in Cotcher offered another justification for its
per se rule exempting the priest’s pulpit exhortations: “This
method of raising money for churches . . . prevails throughout

Two days before the 2004 presidential election, the Reverend George
Regas, a guest preacher at All Saints Episcopal Church in Pasadena, California,
preached a fiery sermon in which he imagined Jesus talking to George W. Bush and
John Kerry and sharply condemning the Bush administration’s prosecution of the war
in Iraq. Father Regas then urged the congregants to “bring a sensitive conscience to the
ballot box” and to “vote your deepest values.” http://www.ombwatch.org/article/
articleview/3167. A week after the election, the Internal Revenue Service notified the
church that it considered the sermon to be a possible violation of the § 501(c)(3)
restriction on political activity in opposition to a candidate, and that it was considering
the revocation of the church’s tax exemption. In September 2007, the IRS finally
informed the church that it was not going to pursue revoking the church’s tax
exemption, but the IRS stated that the sermon did in fact constitute a violation of the
restrictions in § 501(c)(3). Rebecca Trounson, Pasadena Church Wants Apology from
IRS, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2007. Whether or not the IRS originally acted out of partisan
malice and whether or not the Service interpreted the statute correctly, its intervention
in the case was a clear acknowledgment of the strong influence that a pastor’s “mere”
sermon might have on the future actions of his listeners.
307
See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
308
I believe that the court in Cotcher decided correctly when it upheld the
validity of the will, but the court should have reached that decision by noting the
testator’s undoubted free agency, not by noting the absence of one-on-one contact.
309
Howard Witt, Anti-Hate Law Shifts Debate on Gays, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 13,
2007, at 1, 14 (emphasis added) (quoting Bishop Harry Jackson, pastor of Hope
Christian Church of Beltsville, Maryland, who joined three dozen other pastors to buy
a full-page advertisement in USA Today denouncing the proposed amendment to the
hate crimes statute).
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all Christendom.”310 Such a justification cannot be allowed to
stand. That a course of conduct is common has no bearing on
whether that conduct, in a particular case, overpowered the
particular testator and destroyed her free agency. Pleading and
solicitation are common enough behaviors, even among the
laity. Sometimes they amount to undue influence,311 and
sometimes they do not.312
[T]he mere fact that arguments and suggestions are adopted by a
testator, and his will, on that account, is different from what it
otherwise would have been, is not sufficient [for a finding of undue
influence]. It necessarily depends upon the further question as to
whether such advice or suggestions are intelligently and freely
adopted, because they have appealed to the judgment of the testator,
so as to become in accordance with his own desires, or whether
because of the persistency of the importunity, or for any other
reason, the testator is unable to resist, and finally yields, not
because of the voluntary action of his own judgment, but because, on
account of the strength of the influence, or the weakness of his own
judgment and will, he cannot resist longer. It is undoubtedly true, as
has been argued, that in some cases it may be very difficult to
determine whether a suggestion has been thus freely adopted, or has
been merely followed by the testator because it has overcome his free
agency; but it is none the less the true and decisive question, and
must be determined as well as possible in each case from all the facts
and circumstances of the case. The citation of authorities in support
of these statements of the rule is unnecessary, because such
authorities are so exceedingly numerous.313

B.

Needless Concerns About the First Amendment314

Even five decades after Cotcher was decided, judges in
will contests continued to treat statements from the pulpit with
special indulgence, but they did so in the belief that the First
Amendment required such indulgence. The Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, in Roberts-Douglas v. Meares,315
was confronted with some rather extreme declarations from the
310
In re Cotcher’s Estate, 264 N.W. 325, 327 (Mich. 1936). It was actually the
trial court that first used these words, but the Michigan Supreme Court explicitly
endorsed and repeated them.
311
See, e.g., Greuner v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. (In re Greuner’s
Estate), 87 P.2d 872 (Cal. App. 1939).
312
See, e.g., In re Campbell’s Will, 60 A. 880 (Me. 1905).
313
Id. at 881.
314
The freedom of religion clause of the First Amendment applies to the
several states as well as to the federal government. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303 (1940).
315
624 A.2d 405 (D.C. 1992), modified on other grounds and reaff’d, 624 A.2d
431 (D.C. 1993).
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pulpit, including statements by the congregation’s bishop that
“God would punish those who failed to make adequate
contributions.”316 Despite the likelihood that such statements
played a determinative role in inducing parishioners to make
gifts to the bishop’s Evangel Temple, the court cautioned:
“When such remarks are directed from the pulpit to the
congregation as a whole, . . . any attempt to use the sermon as
a basis for setting aside a gift [on undue influence grounds]
implicates significant First Amendment concerns.”317
“Implicates” is a weasel word; everything implicates
First Amendment concerns.318 What the Roberts-Douglas court
presumably meant, but was too fainthearted to say, is that
even when a clergyman’s statements from the pulpit unduly
pressure a parishioner to execute a will in the clergyman’s (or
in his church’s) favor, a probate court would violate the
freedom of religion clause if it barred such a bequest from
taking effect. Such an understanding of freedom of religion is
incorrect. In In re The Bible Speaks,319 for example, in which a
donor sought to rescind on undue influence grounds several
inter vivos gifts made to a religious organization called The
Bible Speaks (“TBS”), the Federal Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit explicitly rejected the notion that the free exercise
clause shields from attack on undue influence grounds the
solicitation of funds by a religious organization.320 The court
reasoned, “Those who run TBS may freely exercise their
religion, but they cannot use the cloak of religion to exert
undue influence of a non-religious nature with impunity.”321
Of course, to characterize TBS’s conduct as “nonreligious” somewhat begs the question. How did the court
conclude that TBS’s fundraising activities were non-religious
(and therefore outside the protection of the free exercise
clause)? Some of those activities consisted of lying—for
316

Roberts-Douglas, 624 A.2d at 410.
Id. at 422.
318
Cf. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A.,
519 U.S. 316 (1997). In that case, the Supreme Court was asked to interpret the
breadth of a federal preemption statute, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (“ERISA”) § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). Id. at 39. Following the pattern
of previous cases, the majority focused its attention on the statutory phrase “relate to.”
Id. Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, argued that “relate to” offers no guidance or
limitation at all inasmuch as “everything is related to everything else.” Id. at 335.
319
Dovydenas v. The Bible Speaks, 869 F.2d 628, 642 (1st Cir.1989).
320
Id. at 645-46. The issue of undue influence was decided on the basis of
Massachusetts law. See id. at 641.
321
Id. at 645.
317
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example, telling the donor that her previous gift to TBS had
miraculously cured a TBS member’s migraine headaches when
in fact the members making that statement knew quite well
that the headaches had continued unabated322—and the court
had little difficulty finding that freedom of religion did not
include the freedom to lie. But some of TBS’s statements were
arguably religious; at least, they were phrased using
conventional religious idiom and were not susceptible of logical
or evidentiary disproof. For example, according to testimony,
the head of TBS (Pastor Stevens) and his subordinates isolated
the donor from her husband (who had opposed her donations)
and told her that she should keep her gifts to TBS secret from
her husband and that her husband’s family and her family
“were evil and were controlled by Satan and demons.”323
According to testimony, Stevens told the donor that her largest
gift to TBS “would be particularly influential in shaping the
world for the return of God.”324 That these statements—made
with undeniably religious terms—were held to evidence TBS’s
undue influence suggests that the case should be read as
holding that solicitations for contributions are inherently nonreligious and therefore unprotected by the Free Exercise
Clause, even if the solicitors’ religion deems the fundraising
activities to be theologically required.
The law of undue influence focuses on a testator’s
response to conduct. While the Free Exercise Clause embraces
both the freedom to believe and the freedom to act, it is only
the latter freedom that is implicated in undue influence cases,
and that latter freedom is not absolute.325 When a religious
person’s freedom to act in accordance with that religion is
burdened by a federal or state law, that law passes
constitutional muster—even in the absence of a compelling
governmental interest—if the burden is an “incidental effect” of
a “law that is neutral and of general applicability.”326 The law of
undue influence is indeed religiously neutral and of general
applicability. It makes no distinction between religious

322

Id. at 633-34.
Id. at 632.
324
Id. at 635.
325
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (“[The First]
Amendment embraces two concepts,—freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first
is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.”).
326
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993).
323
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influencers and secular influencers.327 It was not designed to
suppress the beliefs of any particular religion.328 It does not
involve an inquiry into the truth or falsity of the beliefs of any
religion.329 Consequently, the law of undue influence applies to
the grasping clergyman no less than to the grasping nephew.
No “balancing test”—comparing societal benefit with religious
burden—is to be undertaken.
The Bible Speaks case was decided before (though only
shortly before) the Supreme Court rejected “balancing tests” for
neutral laws of general applicability.330 Accordingly, the Bible
Speaks court may have thought that its rejection of the
proponents’ freedom of religion argument required a finding
that fundraising was inherently nonreligious. Certainly
conduct motivated by pecuniary considerations was, even
according to prior Supreme Court precedents, “particularly
suspect.”331
C.

A Recommended Per Se Rule for Spiritual Advisors

Evidence suggests that the cases in which religious
undue influence is found to have occurred generally involve
nontraditional religions,332 while the cases in which such
327

See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 621, 629 (1978) (declaring
unconstitutional a state law barring any “Minister of the Gospel, or priest of any
denomination whatever” from serving as delegates to the state’s constitutional
convention).
328
In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional a city ordinance that prohibited ritual animal sacrifice. 508 U.S. at
547. The ordinance’s defect was its motivation: the suppression of a particular religious
community. Id. at 534-35.
329
The Freedom of Religion Clause bars courts from inquiring into the truth
or falsity of a religious belief. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944). But
truth or falsity is not an issue in undue influence cases; a statement can constitute
undue influence even if it is factually true. See supra text accompanying notes 246-248.
330
The first case generally thought to have rejected the balancing test
approach was Employment Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 88284 (1990). That Roberts-Douglas was decided after Smith and Ballard rejected any
balancing test makes quite surprising the Roberts-Douglas court’s warnings about the
First Amendment. See supra text accompanying note 317.
331
Richard Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion
Under the First Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 42 (1977).
332
See, e.g., Dovydenas v. The Bible Speaks, 869 F.2d 628, 624, 631 (1st Cir.
1989), (a religious group calling itself “The Bible Speaks”); Roberts-Douglas v. Meares,
624 A.2d 405, 408 (D.C. 1992), modified and reaff’d, 624 A.2d 431 (D.C. 1993) (the
“Evangel Temple”); Carpenter v. Horace Mann Life Ins. Co., 730 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Ark.
Ct. App. 1987) (proponent professed to be a spiritual healer); Hartley v. Toth (In re
Estate of Hee), 252 So. 2d 846, 847 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (Jehovah’s Witnesses);
Nelson v. Dodge, 68 A.2d 51, 53 (R.I. 1949) (“The Church of Jesus, Inc.”). Contra
Corrigan v. Pironi, 23 A. 355, 355-56 (N.J. 1891) (setting aside on undue influence
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influence is found not to have occurred generally involve
mainstream religions.333 One scholar, at least, would probably
find this evidence unsurprising—“I suspect that judgments
about which forms of religious influence are ‘undue’ will often
(though not always) lead to improper consideration of whether
the religion seems unreasonable, excessively authoritarian, or
too threatening of extratemporal consequences [i.e.,
punishment after death]”334—and he therefore cautions against
any undue influence inquiries in will contests involving
religious bequests.335 I share his reluctance to distinguish
grounds an inter vivos transfer to a Roman Catholic priest); Suagee v. Cook (In re
Estate of Maheras), 897 P.2d 268, 270, 274-75 (Okla. 1995) (a successful contest where
proponent was a Baptist minister); see also Bryan v. Norton, 265 S.E.2d 282, 283 (Ga.
1980) (a successful contest in which the proponent was identified only as a “pastor of
the church which the testatrix attended”).
333
See, e.g., Else v. Fremont Methodist Church, 73 N.W.2d 50, 51, 59-60 (Iowa
1955); Waggener v. Gen. Ass’n of Baptists in Ky., 306 S.W.2d 271, 272, 274 (Ky. 1957);
Doyle v. Clancy (In re McIntyre’s Estate), 159 N.W. 517, 517, 519, 524 (Mich. 1916)
(Roman Catholicism); Martin v. Bowdern, 59 S.W. 227. 228, 232 (Mo. 1900) (Roman
Catholicism); First Christian Church in Salem v. McReynolds, 241 P.2d 135, 136-37,
142 (Or. 1952); In re Rowlands’ [sic] Estate, 18 N.W.2d 290, 291, 294 (S.D. 1945)
(Roman Catholicism); Naihaus v. Feigon, 244 S.W.2d 325, 326, 329 (Tex. Civ. App.
1951) (Judaism). But see Stanchfield v. Stanchfield (In re Estate of Stenerson), 348
N.W.2d 141, 142, 144 (N.D. 1984) (informal Bible study group held not to have exerted
undue influence).
In support of its conclusion that a Roman Catholic priest’s exhortations did
not constitute undue influence, one court noted that the priest’s exhortations did not go
“beyond the teachings of the church.” In re Cotcher’s Estate, 264 N.W. 325, 327 (Mich.
1936).
334
Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions—A
Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 627 n.100 (1999).
335
Id. Professor Volokh may undercut the persuasive force of his warning by
citing as support Carpenter v. Horace Mann Life Ins. Co., 730 S.W.2d 502 (Ark. App.
1987), a case that, to me, cries out for the relief of the undue influence finding that the
court quite properly made.. The testator in Carpenter was raised a Catholic and
“considered by her family to be very religious.” Id. at 503. She worked as a registered
nurse and put her husband (who converted to Catholicism to marry her) through
college. Id. They had one son. Id. She entered into a correspondence with Carpenter.
His doctrine is somewhat unclear from the record but appears to have
involved delving into the metaphysical in an effort to get closer to God and
included reincarnation, soul mates, and meditation. He apparently did not
advocate the study of the Bible. He did advocate tithing, however. . . .
Carpenter’s wife, Sherry, wrote letters to [Testator] in which she claimed that
Carpenter was able to transmigrate, did not have to eat or perform other
bodily functions, could heal himself and others, and had other supernatural
powers. . . . From testimony of his other followers, it appears that Carpenter
and Sherry also convinced his “disciples” that he could control their lives from
afar and, if they didn’t want bad things to happen to them, they must give
more and more of their money to him for his “work.”
Id. The testator and her husband had frequent disagreements about money; he resisted
her sending money to Carpenter. Carpenter sent the testator a letter enclosing an
astrological chart for her; the entry for July 1975 (sent in Dec. 1973) said that it was a
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“reasonable” religious beliefs from “unreasonable” ones,336 but I
do not share his reluctance to subject religious bequests to
undue influence analysis. And since I have no reason to
suppose that members of mainstream religions are more
strong-willed or independent-minded than members of
nontraditional religions, I cannot but suspect that mainstream
religions’ greater success in undue influence cases can be
traced to an erroneous—and overly lenient—application of
undue influence law.337 We must correct this error. Human
nature is unlikely to have changed markedly since the days of
the repealed mortmain statutes, when legislators feared that
some religious leaders were taking advantage of the faithful,338
and I remain unwilling to obey the testamentary instructions
of a person whose free will was overcome by the conduct of
another.
The best solution to this problem of clerical overreaching is to treat all relationships between a testator and her
spiritual advisor as per se confidential for purposes of the law
of undue influence. Not only would such a solution recognize
the enormous power of religious influence339 and thereby
prevent undue leniency in the face of undue influence by
favorable period “to begin undertaking new friendships.” Id. at 504. Carpenter urged
her to get a divorce and join his family. Testator did divorce her husband: in July 1975!
Id. She moved to Carpenter’s town. Id. By this time she was giving Carpenter
approximately seventy-five percent of all her earnings. Id. Her will left him everything.
Id.
Two psychologists who reviewed the letters between Testator and her
parents and between Testator and the Carpenters and reviewed the depositions of
several witnesses “concluded that [Testator] had a very dependent personality, was
searching for a father figure to care for her and that Carpenter fit her needs
perfectly. . . . Both testified that it was not their belief that Carpenter had actually
knowingly attempted to extort money from [Testator]. . . . It was their opinion that he
was not intentionally a ‘con artist’ but that his teachings had this effect on gullible
women. . . . [He] encouraged them to give him money for his ‘work’ and free him from
the necessity of holding a job so he could devote his entire time and energy to his
teaching and writing. Both psychologists concluded that because of Carpenter’s mental
hold on [Testator], the veiled threats that if she left him something terrible might
happen to her, . . . she was not free to fully exercise her own independence . . . . [and
was] under the influence of Carpenter.” Id. at 504-05. “The record supports a finding
that there was a systematic alienation of [Testator] from her husband, son, parent, and
siblings.” Id. at 508.
If that is not undue influence, I do not know what is.
336
The rules of undue influence, properly applied, do not require such a
distinction to be made. See text at supra note 296.
337
That a court seemed willing to exempt from undue-influence examination a
practice that “prevails throughout all Christendom” illustrates the unwarranted
leniency to which I refer. See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
338
See supra note 18.
339
See, e.g., BATSON ET AL., supra note 291, at 198, 296.
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mainstream clergyman,340 it would also guard against the
temptation to assess the reasonableness of any religious or
spiritual beliefs. The contestant would need to produce
evidence only as to the category into which the alleged
influencer fell (together with evidence of a “suspicious
circumstance”341); the inquiry would then turn, with the
proponent having the burden of production, to the
fundamental—and purely secular—issue of whether the will
represented the testator’s own wishes.342
One can find the occasional case that already does treat
the relationship between a testator and her spiritual advisor as
per se confidential,343 but most courts currently view the
question as one of fact, to be decided on a case by case basis.344
Accordingly, the creation of the per se rule that I recommend
would represent a change in the law for most jurisdictions. At
least one court has opined that such a change would require
legislative action,345 but legislatures have acted along these
lines before. Idaho, for example, enacted a statute providing
that a bequest to a nursing home where the testator was in
residence shall be presumed to have been the result of undue

340

A transfer might be set aside on undue influence grounds where a
confidential relationship existed that would not be set aside in the absence of a
confidential relationship. Roberts-Douglas v. Meares, 624 A.2d 405, 421 (D.C. 1992),
modified on other grounds and reaff’d, 624 A.2d 431 (D.C. 1993).
341
See supra text accompanying note 252.
342
See supra text accompanying note 254.
343
See, e.g., Nelson v. Dodge, 68 A.2d 51, 57 (R.I. 1949) (inter vivos transfer);
In re Rowland’s Estate, 18 N.W.2d 290, 293 (S.D. 1945).
344
See, e.g., Else v. Fremont Methodist Church, 73 N.W.2d 50, 57 (Iowa 1955);
First Christian Church in Salem v. McReynolds, 241 P.2d 135, 142 (Or. 1952); Barlowe
v. Brevard, 213 S.W.3d 298, 304 (Tenn. App. 2006); see also In re The Bible Speaks, 869
F.2d 628, 641-42 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 816 (1989) (“Massachusetts has never
directly addressed the question of whether a pastor-communicant relationship is per se
a confidential one when undue influence is alleged. We need not decide whether
Massachusetts would hold that the pastor-communicant is by itself a confidential
relationship. Here, we have found such a relationship on the basis of other
factors . . . .”).
345
See Miller v. Kraft (In re Estate of Wagner), 265 N.W.2d 459, 464 (N.D.
1984) (“[I]f a presumption is to be created providing that undue influence is presumed
whenever the attorney who drew the will is also directly or indirectly a substantial
beneficiary under the will[,] it should be accomplished by a legislative act rather than
by a judicial decree.”). In point of fact, since the attorney-client relationship is a
confidential relationship and since being a substantial beneficiary is a “suspicious
circumstance,” see supra text accompanying notes 278-281, virtually every American
jurisdiction would—as a matter of judge-made law—find that those facts give rise to a
presumption of undue influence, so I am puzzled why the North Dakota law of undue
influence was thought to have a lacuna that only legislative action could fill.
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influence, and only clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary can rebut that presumption.346
So far as I know, the per se rules in Rhode Island and
South Dakota—treating all relationships between testators and
their spiritual advisors as confidential relationships347—have
not been challenged on freedom of religion grounds. But should
they be challenged? That is, would my proposed per se rule
survive a challenge based on freedom of religion? Clearly, such
a rule would be neither neutral nor of general applicability;348
rather, it would specially target religion-based relationships
and treat them differently from most secular relationships. To
pass muster under the Freedom of Religion Clause, such a rule,
said the United States Supreme Court in Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, “must be justified by a compelling
governmental interest [as opposed to being merely reasonable]
and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.”349 In
other words, the rule should be subject to strict scrutiny.350
The state governmental interest at issue here is “the
orderly settlement of estates and the dependability of titles to
property passing under [wills or] intestacy laws.”351 Clearly, the
settlement of estates would not be orderly if serious doubt
existed among interested family members as to the
genuineness or trustworthiness of a purported will, and titles
to property would remain unreliable as long as such doubts
remained unresolved.352 But is such an interest “compelling?”
The United States Supreme Court has characterized it as
“substantial,”353 but such a characterization does not preclude
its being “compelling” as well. The Court made the
characterization in an unsuccessful challenge, on “equal
protection” grounds, to a statute affecting the inheritance
rights of nonmarital children: a group whose interests require

346

IDAHO CODE § 15-2-616 (2007).
See supra text accompanying note 343.
348
See supra note 326.
349
508 U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993).
350
Perhaps the initial case applying strict scrutiny analysis to a statute
arguably impinging on the freedom of religion was Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
406-07 (1963), where state law denied the petitioner unemployment compensation
because her unemployment resulted from her refusal to violate her religious principles
by working on Saturdays. The law was declared unconstitutional.
351
Lalli v. Lalli (In re Estate of Lalli), 371 N.E.2d 481, 482-83 (N.Y. 1977),
aff’d sub nom. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 264 (1978).
352
See supra text accompanying notes 195-199.
353
Lalli, 439 U.S. at 271 (plurality opinion).
347
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only “intermediate scrutiny”354 of potentially discriminatory
state actions, and under the immediate scrutiny standard a
“substantial” state interest is good enough.355 It was
unnecessary for the Court to determine whether the interest
rose to the level of being compelling.356
Certainly one can adduce examples of state interests
that have been found sufficiently compelling to justify
incidental burdens on the free exercise of religion. In Braunfeld
v. Brown,357 a state’s “interest in providing one uniform day of
rest for all workers”358 was held to justify Sunday closing laws,
even though such laws made more expensive the religious
beliefs of business owners whose religion required them to close
on Saturdays as well.359 In Hernandez v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, the federal government’s “interest in
maintaining a sound tax system free of myriad exceptions
flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs” was held to
justify the denial of an income tax charitable deduction for
payments for “training” and “auditing” sessions made
mandatory by a particular religion.360 Difficult as it may be to
compare apples and oranges, it seems intuitively correct to say
that a state’s interest in the orderly settlement of estates and
the dependability of titles to property ought to be no less
compelling than its interest in providing a uniform day of rest
or maintaining a sound tax system.
A useful approach to the problem of identifying the
kinds of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause is
suggested by language in the majority opinion in Sherbert v.
Verner.361 The case involved a South Carolina statute that
354
See In re Estate of Lalli, 371 N.E.2d at 482-83. The Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia held that—under that state’s constitution—nonmarital
children were a “suspect classification” requiring strict scrutiny of any state statute
treating them differently from marital children. Adkins v. McEldowney, 280 S.E.2d
231, 233 (W. Va. 1981).
355
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 688 (7th ed.
2004).
356
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts seems to have characterized
such a state interest as “compelling,” though evidently the characterization was made
for state constitutional purposes, not federal. Lowell v. Kowalski, 405 N.E.2d 135, 140
(Mass. 1980) (citing Commonwealth v. MacKenzie, 334 N.E.2d 613, 616 (Mass. 1975)).
357
366 U.S. 599 (1961).
358
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408 (1963).
359
Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 609.
360
Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699-700 (1989)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260
(1982)).
361
Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398.
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denied an unemployed person certain insurance benefits if her
unemployed status was prolonged, without good cause, by her
failure to accept available work.362 The petitioner in the case
refused on religious grounds to work on Saturdays, and her
refusal prolonged her unemployed status.363 The Court held
that the state’s denial of unemployment insurance benefits in
her case violated her rights under the Freedom of Religion
Clause. In reaching that result, the Court noted that refusing
to work on Saturdays was a “basic tenet” of her religion,364 and
that the state law violated her freedom of religion because it
“force[d] her to choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and
abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept
work, on the other hand.”365 Similarly, in a successful
constitutional challenge to a city requirement forbidding police
officers to wear beards brought by Muslim officers whose
religious beliefs compelled them to wear beards,366 the court of
appeals took pains to find that the wearing of beards was a
fundamental requirement of Sunni Islam;367 accordingly, the
invalidated requirement would have forced these men to choose
between (1) keeping their jobs (by committing a “sin”368) and
(2) following their religious beliefs and losing their jobs.
My proposed presumption does not put anyone in such a
dilemma. Clergymen do not have to choose between speaking
about bequests (and thereby forfeiting them) and remaining
silent. The faithful do not have to choose between yielding to
persuasion (and having their gifts annulled) and making no
religious gifts at all. The presumption is intended to reach only
those instances where a clergyman’s conduct has destroyed a
testator’s free agency, and courts should be suspicious of any
claim that the destruction of a congregant’s free agency is a
“basic tenet” of any religion.369
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Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401.
Id. at 399-400.
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Id. at 400 n.1.
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Id. at 360-61.
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Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715
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Clause” (emphasis added)).
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My proposed presumption likewise satisfies the
requirement of being “narrowly tailored.”370 It recognizes the
extraordinary power of religion and it recognizes the state’s
interest in distributing property only on the basis of reliable
indicia of intent, but it does not prohibit bequests to religious
actors or institutions. It does not even create a presumption of
invalidity (which the Idaho nursing home statute does).371 It
mandates that the relationship between a testator and her
spiritual advisor be considered per se confidential, but even the
confidentiality designation does not give rise to a presumption
of invalidity unless the contestant can produce evidence of a
“suspicious circumstance,” such as active participation in the
procurement of the will. Even then, the result is only a
presumption of invalidity, and it can be rebutted.
The First Amendment does not require that the income
of religious organizations be exempt from federal income tax.
That it is in fact exempt is merely a matter of legislative
grace.372 Accordingly, the government is permitted to make
substantial inquiries into a religious organization’s activities in
order to determine whether the organization is entitled to its
claimed exemption, including inquiries as to the content and
intended effect of the organization’s publications or
statements.373 The rights to bequeath and inherit property are
likewise matters of legislative grace.374 A state could
constitutionally abolish the right of testation, requiring all of a
decedent’s property to pass to natural persons under the
intestacy statute.375 Accordingly, a testator’s power to bequeath
property to a religious charity exists at the sufferance of the
state and may accordingly be subject to conditions, so long as
the conditions do not operate to inhibit or deter the exercise of
constitutionally protected freedoms376 and as long as the
conditions operate similarly in the case of all religions rather
than favoring one religion over another.377
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See supra text accompanying note 350.
See supra note 228.
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See Better Bus. Bureau of Washington, D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326
U.S. 279 (1945); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934); Christian
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The proposed per se rule does require courts to
distinguish those persons who are dispensing religious or
spiritual advice to a testator from those who are acting as
advisors in some other capacity, but distinguishing the
religious from the nonreligious is a necessary and familiar
judicial duty. “Though litigation of the question whether a
given group or set of beliefs is or is not religious is a delicate
business, our legal system sometimes requires it.”378
IV.

CONCLUSION

Courts and legislatures have, for centuries, been wary of
bequests to religious organizations or leaders. Concern that
such bequests reflected merely the deathbed fears of the
faithful manipulated by the clergy led legislatures to enact
mortmain statutes. But such statutes were not only
unworkable; they sometimes invalidated perfectly genuine
religious bequests. The law of undue influence remains a
worthy tool for ensuring the legitimacy of such bequests, but it
can best serve as protection if relationships between testators
and their spiritual advisors are deemed to be per se
confidential. Such a per se rule, which recognizes the
extraordinary power of religious influence (for good and for ill),
would allocate more sensibly the risks of nonpersuasion. Under
it, the proponent of the will, after the contestant presented
evidence of a “suspicious circumstance” such as a substantial
bequest in favor of the influencer, would have the burden of
producing evidence that the bequest represented the testator’s
actual wishes.

378
Founding Church of Scientology of Washington, D.C. v. United States, 409
F.2d 1146, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (footnote omitted).

